- mbed-tls - lists.trustedfirmware.org

Re: MbedTLS X.509 Basic Constraints Extension Issue (was: Re: Security Contact for mbedtls?)

by Gilles Peskine

Hello again, Looking at the content of the issue, it is one of the two bugs in basicConstraints parsing covered by CVE-2026-49300, which we fixed in our July release. https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/security-advisories/mbedtls-secur… I can add you as an independent reporter to the credits list. Let me know how you'd like to be acknowledged. -- Best regards, Gilles Peskine On 19/08/2026 10:15, Maximilian Radoy wrote: > > Dear Gilles Peskine, > > we are trying to get in contact with > mbed-tls-security(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org for almost three months > now regarding a security-relevant finding in mbedtls, but we do not > get any response at all. > > As you seem to be (according to github) actively involved in that > project, we'd like to ask you whether there are any alternative ways > to deliver our security report? Otherwise, we may post it as regular > github issue. > > Thank you in advance for your help! > > Best regards, > Maximilian Radoy > > -- > > *Maximilian Radoy* > Research Assistant > System Security Group > Paderborn University > Universität Paderborn <https://www.uni-paderborn.de/en> > Fürstenallee 11 > 33102 Paderborn > Germany > *Office* F2.308 > *Telephone* +49 5251 60-6724 > *E-Mail* maximilian.radoy(a)uni-paderborn.de > > > Instagram <https://www.instagram.com/uni_paderborn/> Facebook > <https://www.facebook.com/unipaderborn> LinkedIn > <https://de.linkedin.com/school/uni-paderborn/> YouTube > <https://www.youtube.com/user/upbvideo> >

18 hours, 7 minutes

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DTLS 1.3 contribution

by Yaron Sheffer

[Apologies, resending as text] Hi, I've been working on an implementation of DTLS 1.3 in Mbed TLS, basically as a side project. For transparency, I have used AI heavily in this work, but I am fully accountable for the code. Obviously, this is a large quantity of code. I would appreciate your feedback on the following plan [1]: I could break the contribution into 7-8 PRs (first PR about 1k LOC, largest PR 5-6K). I would ensure from day one that the new functionality remains off by default and avoid any changes to existing TLS and DTLS 1.2 behavior. Then we could have users try it out for a while as opt-in, and only then the project team can decide to enable it by default. The code base is available as a branch [2] and is accompanied by copious documentation [3]. Recently I updated the code in line with both 4.2.0 of this library and the new version -02 of the rfc9147bis Internet Draft. The code includes unit tests, integration tests and interoperability testing with wolfSSL. I have also run multiple security reviews of the code and reviewed it manually, and I'm ready to iterate as needed to follow the project's processes. If you are open to this plan, I will open a tracking issue right away and follow with smallish PR1. Looking forward to contributing to this community! Thanks, Yaron [1] https://github.com/yaronf/mbedtls/blob/dtls13/local-docs/upstream-dtls13-pr… [2] https://github.com/yaronf/mbedtls/tree/dtls13 [3] https://github.com/yaronf/mbedtls/tree/dtls13/local-docs

1 week, 5 days

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DTLS 1.3 contribution

by Yaron Sheffer

2 weeks, 2 days

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MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO for custom mbedtls_time_t

by Huber, Ralf

Dear Mbed TLS contributors, We are using mbedtls v4 for X.509 certificate verification on a 32 bit microcontroller. The device has an RTC chip and we use its time for mbedtls by defining MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT. This is working so far. The compiler provides <time.h>, with time_t being a signed 32 bit type. I would like to stop mbedtls from using the date and time functions of <time.h> and change mbedtls_time_t to unsigned 32 bit to avoid the year 2038 problem (when signed 32 bit time_t will overflow). To do this, I defined #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO unsigned long I also changed the custom time function (MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT) to return unsigned values and I defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT and provided a custom mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() that accepts unsigned values. When I build mbedtls with these settings, I get an error from tf_psa_crypto_check_config.h: #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO) &&\ ( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME) ||\ defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT) ) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME/MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT cannot be defined simultaneously" #endif I wonder if this check is actually necessary or maybe a mistake? Actually, I expected the opposite, i.e. #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO) &&\ !( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME) ||\ defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT) ) #error "Must provide alternate time() function compatible with type defined by MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO" #endif Could somebody please explain why MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO can't be used with MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT? Can/Should I comment out the #error? I tried that and the library compiles without errors, and the software using the library also compiles without errors, but I have not yet checked, if it actually works. Best regards, Ralf Huber KION Supply Chain Solutions Linde Material Handling GmbH, Sitz der Gesellschaft: Aschaffenburg, Registergericht: Aschaffenburg HRB9963, Ust-IdNr. DE814809128, Gesch?ftsf?hrung: Andreas Krinninger (Vorsitzender), Dr. Karoline Jung-Senssfelder, Ulrike Just, Dr. Frank Schepp, Vorsitzende des Aufsichtsrats: Valeria Gargiulo

3 weeks

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Post quantum support, x25519mlkem768

by Christian Huitema

Do we have support for x25519mlkem768 in Mbed TLS? -- Christian Huitema

3 weeks, 5 days

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Publish Mbed TLS security advisories in machine-readable format for SBOM scanners

by Schlegelmilch, Nils

Hi Mbed TLS team, I would like to ask whether Mbed TLS could publish security advisories in a machine-readable format, for example GitHub Security Advisories or OSV. Security fixes are currently visible in release notes and documentation before they appear in NVD/GHSA/OSV. This creates a detection gap for automated vulnerability scanners such as Dependency-Track, because they rely on structured advisory data with affected versions, fixed versions, and identifiers such as CPE, PURL, or Git ranges. For example, when a security release is available, Dependency-Track may not alert until the corresponding CVE or advisory appears in one of its vulnerability data sources. This can delay automated remediation even though a patched Mbed TLS version is already released. Would the project consider publishing machine-readable advisories at release time, or is there already a preferred process for this? Thanks! Nils Schlegelmilch Development Phone +49 7836 50-9883 E-Mail n.schlegelmilch(a)vega.com<mailto:n.schlegelmilch@vega.com> [cid:image001.png@01DD1042.23E9BE30] VEGA Grieshaber KG | Am Hohenstein 113 | 77761 Schiltach | Germany [cid:image002.png@01DD1042.23E9BE30]<https://de.linkedin.com/company/vega-grieshaber-kg>[cid:image003.png@01DD1042.23E9BE30]<https://www.vega.com/>[cid:image004.png@01DD1042.23E9BE30]<https://www.youtube.com/vegagrieshaberkg> Unsere Datenschutzhinweise und somit auch die Informationen gem. Art. 13 DSGVO finden Sie im Internet unter www.vega.com/datenschutz VEGA Grieshaber KG Kommanditgesellschaft mit Sitz in Wolfach Registergericht: Freiburg HRA 680 687 Persönlich haftende Gesellschafter: Isabel Grieshaber Grieshaber Holding GmbH Sitz: Wolfach Registergericht: Freiburg HRB 680 271 Geschäftsführer: Isabel Grieshaber, Markus Kniesel USt.-Id.-Nr.: DE143030199

1 month

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Mbed TLS and TF-PSA-Crypto releases now available

by Minos Galanakis

Hi Mbed TLS users, We are pleased to announce the release of Mbed TLS 4.2.0, Mbed TLS 4.1.1, Mbed TLS 3.6.7, TF-PSA-Crypto 1.2.0, and TF-PSA-Crypto 1.1.1. These releases address several security issues, include bug fixes, and bring other improvements. Mbed TLS 4.1 and TF-PSA-Crypto 1.1 remain Long Term Support (LTS) releases and are supported until March 2029. Mbed TLS 3.6 remains supported until March 2027. We recommend all users review the changes, assess any impact, and upgrade as appropriate. Full details are available in the release notes: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/mbedtls-4.2.0 https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/mbedtls-4.1.1 https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/mbedtls-3.6.7 https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/TF-PSA-Crypto/releases/tag/tf-psa-crypto-1.2.0 https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/TF-PSA-Crypto/releases/tag/tf-psa-crypto-1.1.1 Kind regards, The Mbed TLS Team

1 month, 1 week

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[Mbed-tls-announce] Mbed TLS and TF-PSA-Crypto releases now available

by Minos Galanakis via Mbed-tls-announce

Hi Mbed TLS users, We are pleased to announce the release of Mbed TLS 4.2.0, Mbed TLS 4.1.1, Mbed TLS 3.6.7, TF-PSA-Crypto 1.2.0, and TF-PSA-Crypto 1.1.1. These releases address several security issues, include bug fixes, and bring other improvements. Mbed TLS 4.1 and TF-PSA-Crypto 1.1 remain Long Term Support (LTS) releases and are supported until March 2029. Mbed TLS 3.6 remains supported until March 2027. We recommend all users review the changes, assess any impact, and upgrade as appropriate. Full details are available in the release notes: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/mbedtls-4.2.0 https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/mbedtls-4.1.1 https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/mbedtls-3.6.7 https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/TF-PSA-Crypto/releases/tag/tf-psa-crypto-1.2.0 https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/TF-PSA-Crypto/releases/tag/tf-psa-crypto-1.1.1 Kind regards, The Mbed TLS Team IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. -- Mbed-tls-announce mailing list -- mbed-tls-announce(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org To unsubscribe send an email to mbed-tls-announce-leave(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org

1 month, 1 week

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mbedTLS 3.6.6 TLS 1.3: Heap corruption issue

by Sielatchom, Cesaire

Hello, while setting up a TLS 1.3 client based on mbedTLS 3.6.6, I am facing a memory corruption issue and would appreciate any advice on how to debug it further. Initial symptoms ================ Originally I was using FreeRTOS heap_4 as the allocator. During the TLS handshake I eventually hit one of the following assertions inside the FreeRTOS heap implementation: configASSERT( heapBLOCK_IS_ALLOCATED( pxLink ) != 0 ); configASSERT( pxLink->pxNextFreeBlock == heapPROTECT_BLOCK_POINTER( NULL ) ); This suggested corruption of the heap block header structures. Isolation attempt ================= To exclude interactions with the FreeRTOS heap allocator, I reconfigured mbedTLS to use a dedicated static memory pool by enabling: MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C I allocated a dedicated 1 MB memory pool located in external RAM and initialized it via: mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init(...); No other software component is intended to access this memory area. New failure =========== With the dedicated memory pool in place, the TLS 1.3 handshake now fails inside memory_buffer_alloc.c with the following consistency check: if (cur->alloc != 0) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "FATAL: block in free_list but allocated data\n"); #endif mbedtls_exit(1); } The execution stops with: FATAL: block in free_list but allocated data This appears to indicate that a block found in the free list still has its allocation flag set. What I have checked so far ========================== - Initially I suspected FreeRTOS heap corruption. - I added hardware watchpoints at the beginning and end of the affected memory blocks. - No obvious buffer overflow was detected using those watchpoints. - Secure and Non-Secure heaps are separated. - I experimented with MPU guard regions. - The issue is reproducible under TLS/WebSocket traffic. - mbedTLS is now running from a dedicated static memory pool. - The dedicated mbedTLS pool is approximately 1 MB and is not shared with the FreeRTOS heap. Platform ======== - STM32U585 - TrustZone enabled - FreeRTOS - mbedTLS 3.6.6 - TLS 1.3 enabled - WebSocket over TLS Are there recommended debugging options or allocator diagnostics that could help identify the offending allocation or the block whose metadata became inconsistent? Has anyone experienced similar issues specifically with TLS 1.3 handshakes, especially during key share generation? Relevant handshake log ====================== init connect[1] . Performing the SSL/TLS handshake...[TLS][2] ../SRV_TLS/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c:4670: => handshake [TLS][2] ../SRV_TLS/mbedtls/library/ssl_msg.c:2356: => flush output [TLS][2] ../SRV_TLS/mbedtls/library/ssl_msg.c:2365: <= flush output [TLS][2] ../SRV_TLS/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c:4589: client state: MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST [TLS][3] ../SRV_TLS/mbedtls/library/ssl_misc.h:1353: handshake state: 0 (MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST) -> 1 (MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO) [TLS][2] ../SRV_TLS/mbedtls/library/ssl_msg.c:2356: => flush output [TLS][2] ../SRV_TLS/mbedtls/library/ssl_msg.c:2365: <= flush output [TLS][2] ../SRV_TLS/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c:4589: client state: MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO [TLS][2] ../SRV_TLS/mbedtls/library/ssl_client.c:921: => write client hello [TLS][3] ../SRV_TLS/mbedtls/library/ssl_client.c:487: dumping 'client hello, random bytes' (32 bytes) [TLS][3] ../SRV_TLS/mbedtls/library/ssl_client.c:487: 0000: 9a 99 37 69 fa 5e 07 f7 ff c8 5b ac 56 fe 45 1a ..7i.^....[.V.E. [TLS][3] ../SRV_TLS/mbedtls/library/ssl_client.c:487: 0010: 53 d1 a1 d6 27 f6 5d 5a 4e 5b 2a 80 4c 1e 9b cb S...'.]ZN[*.L... [TLS][3] ../SRV_TLS/mbedtls/library/ssl_client.c:512: dumping 'session id' (0 bytes) [TLS][3] ../SRV_TLS/mbedtls/library/ssl_client.c:370: client hello, add ciphersuite: 1301, TLS1-3-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 [TLS][3] ../SRV_TLS/mbedtls/library/ssl_client.c:388: adding EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV [TLS][3] ../SRV_TLS/mbedtls/library/ssl_client.c:397: client hello, got zu cipher suites [TLS][3] ../SRV_TLS/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_client.c:57: client hello, adding supported versions extension [TLS][3] ../SRV_TLS/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_client.c:80: supported version: [3:4] [TLS][3] ../SRV_TLS/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_client.c:86: supported version: [3:3] [TLS][3] ../SRV_TLS/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_client.c:573: no cookie to send; skip extension [TLS][3] ../SRV_TLS/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_client.c:285: client hello: adding key share extension [TLS][1] ../SRV_TLS/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c:1552: Perform PSA-based ECDH/FFDH computation. FATAL: block in free_list but allocated data Any suggestions, debugging techniques, or similar experiences would be greatly appreciated. Thank you very much. Best regards, Cesaire Mit freundlichen Grüßen / Best regards i. A. Cesaire Sielatchom Konstrukteur und Entwickler [BKS_4c.gif] BKS GmbH Entwicklung Elektronik Heidestr. 71 D-42549 Velbert Telefon +49 2051 201 528<tel:+49%202051%20201%20528> Cesaire.Sielatchom(a)bks.de<mailto:Cesaire.Sielatchom@bks.de> www.bks.de<https://www.bks.de/de-de> BKS GmbH Sitz der Gesellschaft: Velbert Amtsgericht Wuppertal, HRB 17711 GF: Thomas Polonyi Vorsitzender des Aufsichtsrats: Dirk Leuker WEEE-Reg.-Nr. DE 14737171 [Email_Footer SicherheitsExpo 2026.jpg] Diese Mail ist vertraulich. Wenn Sie nicht der beabsichtigte Empfänger sind, dürfen Sie die Informationen nicht offenlegen, benutzen, kopieren oder verteilen. Wenn Sie diese Mail durch einen Fehler bekommen haben, teilen Sie uns dies bitte dadurch mit, dass Sie diese Mail an den Absender zurückschicken. Bitte löschen Sie danach diese Mail und alle Anhänge. Danke. This e-mail message including any attachment is intended for the sole use of the individual or entity named above. If you are not the intended recipient, please do not read, copy, use or disclose this communication to others; also please notify the sender by replying to this message and then delete it and all attachments from your system.Thank you.

1 month, 2 weeks

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Updated invitation with note: MBed-TLS Technical Forum - Asia @ Every 4 weeks from 10am to 10:50am on Monday (GMT) (mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org)

by Shaun Longhorn

This event has been updated with a note: "Pushing meeting link" Changed: location MBed-TLS Technical Forum - Asia Every 4 weeks from 10am to 10:50am on Monday United Kingdom Time Location https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/97758661706?pwd=baMjUvnWbY20z3ignQca7QVahhozkI… https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Flinaro-org.zoom.us%2Fj%2F9775866… Join Zoom Meeting https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/99853938085?pwd=D3au597hb9J1veo1W74pIqkvY6VaDI… Join by phone (US) +1 833-548-0282 passcode: 12278212 Joining instructions https://www.google.com/url?q=https://applications.zoom.us/addon/invitation/… Joining notes Meeting host: shaun.longhorn(a)linaro.org Join Zoom Meeting: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/99853938085?pwd=D3au597hb9J1veo1W74pIqkvY6VaDI… ──────────https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/99853938085?pwd=D3au597hb9J1veo1W74pIqkvY6VaDI.1&jst=2Joining Instructions────────── Guests mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org View all guest info https://calendar.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=NjI4c3NnYjFoZHRh… Reply for mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org and view more details https://calendar.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=NjI4c3NnYjFoZHRh… Your attendance is optional. ~~//~~ Invitation from Google Calendar: https://calendar.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this email because you are an attendee on the event. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organizer, be added to the guest list, invite others regardless of their own invitation status, or modify your RSVP. Learn more https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding

1 month, 2 weeks

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