- mbed-tls - lists.trustedfirmware.org

by S Krishnan, Archanaa

Hello, What is the extent of PSA Crypto API 1.1 support available in mbedTLS today? From the road map, API v1.0 is supported. I also see that PBKDF, which is in PSA API v1.1, is in development. Regards, Archanaa

2 years

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Is there a DTLS 1.3 roadmap?

by Achim Kraus

Hi List, last year I read in a comment https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/5443#issuecomment-1017379238 that DTLS 1.3 is on the roadmap for the near future. Is it available? Are there any schedules? The Eclipse/wakaama project is looking for DTLS 1.3 (see https://github.com/eclipse/wakaama/issues/684), therefore I'm asking best regards Achim

2 years

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Canceled event with note: MBed TLS Technical Forum @ Mon Apr 10, 2023 8:30am - 9:30am (MST) (mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org)

by don.harbin＠linaro.org

This event has been canceled with a note: "Bank Holiday - Cancelling " MBed TLS Technical Forum Monday Apr 10, 2023 ⋅ 8:30am – 9:30am Mountain Standard Time - Phoenix Trusted Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting. Topic: MBed TLS Technical Forum Time: Oct 25, 2021 04:30 PM London Every 4 weeks on Mon, 20 occurrence(s) Oct 25, 2021 04:30 PM Nov 22, 2021 04:30 PM Dec 20, 2021 04:30 PM Jan 17, 2022 04:30 PM Feb 14, 2022 04:30 PM Mar 14, 2022 04:30 PM Apr 11, 2022 04:30 PM May 9, 2022 04:30 PM Jun 6, 2022 04:30 PM Jul 4, 2022 04:30 PM Aug 1, 2022 04:30 PM Aug 29, 2022 04:30 PM Sep 26, 2022 04:30 PM Oct 24, 2022 04:30 PM Nov 21, 2022 04:30 PM Dec 19, 2022 04:30 PM Jan 16, 2023 04:30 PM Feb 13, 2023 04:30 PM Mar 13, 2023 04:30 PM Apr 10, 2023 04:30 PM Please download and import the following iCalendar (.ics) files to your calendar system. Weekly: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/meeting/tJEkceuurT4sGdaksikbUn6FARB9Kuk3ac2o/ics… Join Zoom Meeting https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/95962635632?pwd=STFkQVltejAzRDJ6NmoxZjhmZC9RUT… Meeting ID: 959 6263 5632 Passcode: 018366 One tap mobile +13462487799,,95962635632# US (Houston) +16699009128,,95962635632# US (San Jose) Dial by your location +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston) +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose) +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma) +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago) +1 646 558 8656 US (New York) +1 301 715 8592 US (Washington DC) 877 853 5247 US Toll-free 888 788 0099 US Toll-free Meeting ID: 959 6263 5632 Find your local number: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/u/aewUpnQu5y Guests nnac123(a)gmail.com psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org ~~//~~ Invitation from Google Calendar: https://calendar.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this email because you are an attendee on the event. To stop receiving future updates for this event, decline this event. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organizer, be added to the guest list, invite others regardless of their own invitation status, or modify your RSVP. Learn more https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding

2 years

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[Mbed-tls-announce] New Mbed TLS releases : 3.4.0 and 2.28.3

by Paul Elliott via Mbed-tls-announce

Hi Mbed TLS users, We have released Mbed TLS versions 3.4.0 and 2.28.3 These releases of Mbed TLS address several security issues, provide bug fixes, and bring other minor changes. Full details are available in the release notes. (https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/releases/tag/mbedtls-3.4.0, https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/releases/tag/mbedtls-2.28.3). We recommend all users to consider whether they are impacted, and to upgrade appropriately. The Mbed TLS team IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. -- Mbed-tls-announce mailing list -- mbed-tls-announce(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org To unsubscribe send an email to mbed-tls-announce-leave(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org

2 years

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support of EC and hashing algorithms

by c.luetzenkirchen＠innolectric.ag

hello, I am currently evaluating if latest mbed-TLS release does support following algorithms: - ECDSA using secp521r1 curve - EDDSA using Edwards curves 448 or 448-Goldilocks - ECDH using mentioned curves - SHA512 - SHAKE256 For some of them like SHA512 I found information in the documentation. Others like EDDSA and SHAKE256 seem to be incomplete. Is my assumption correct that TLS 1.3 is therefore NOT ready to use yet? Best regards, Chris

2 years

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Question about long-time support for 3.x branch

by Maher Azarkan

Hello everyone, We are currently using the mbedTLS version 2.16.12 in our firmware and we are planning an update to a newer branch. I would like to know, how long the different 3.x branches will be supported. Is there any fix roadmap, how long an mbedTLS branch must be supported and maintained after its first release? I could only find this information for the 2.28 branch (support until end of 2024). Thank you for any help you can offer. Best regards Maher Azarkan Hilscher Gesellschaft f?r Systemautomation mbH Rheinstra?e 15 / D-65795 Hattersheim / Germany Sitz der Gesellschaft / place of business: Hattersheim | Gesch?ftsf?hrer / managing director: Sebastian Hilscher, Hans-J?rgen Hilscher Handelsregister / commercial register: Frankfurt B 26873 | Ust. Idnr. / VAT No.: DE113852715 Registergericht / register court: Amtsgericht Frankfurt/Main Important Information: This e-mail message including its attachments contains confidential and legally protected information solely intended for the addressee. If you are not the intended addressee of this message, please contact the addresser immediately and delete this message including its attachments. The unauthorized dissemination, copying and change of this e-mail are strictly forbidden. The addresser shall not be liable for the content of such changed e-mails. Wichtiger Hinweis: Diese E-Mail einschlie?lich ihrer Anh?nge enth?lt vertrauliche und rechtlich gesch?tzte Informationen, die nur f?r den Adressaten bestimmt sind. Sollten Sie nicht der bezeichnete Adressat sein, so teilen Sie dies bitte dem Absender umgehend mit und l?schen Sie diese Nachricht und ihre Anh?nge. Die unbefugte Weitergabe, das Anfertigen von Kopien und jede Ver?nderung der E-Mail ist untersagt. Der Absender haftet nicht f?r Inhalte von ver?nderten E-Mails.

2 years

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Porting from OpenSSL to MbedTLS

by matteo.cogi＠alice.it

Dear all, I need to migrate from OpenSSL to MbedTLS. I have to implement a SCEP client in my embedded environment composed by FreeRTOS as OS, mbedTLS as security layer and LwIP as network stack. The best candidate for the SCEP client role is the sscep library. It works very well under Ubuntu, but now I need to use it in my embedded environment, so I have to adapt sscep for MbedTLS. I would like to know if there is some porting/migration guide from OpenSSL to MbedTLS. Any kind of suggestion or support will be appreciated. Thanks in advance. Regards, Matteo

2 years

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Reminder: MBed TLS Tech Forum - Asia/Europe

by Don Harbin

Hi All, A gentle reminder that the Asia-Europe timezone-friendly MBed TLS Tech forum is next Monday at 10:00am PM UK time. Invite details can be found on the online calendar here <https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/>. If you have any topics, please let Dave Rodgman know. :) Best regards, Don Harbin TrustedFirmware Community Manager don.harbin(a)linaro.org

2 years

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security issue in mbedtls 3.30

by Avi Epstein

security issue in mbedtls 3.30 in the release notes: "An adversary with access to precise enough information about memory accesses (typically, an untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) could recover an RSA private key after observing the victim performing a single private-key operation if the window size used for the exponentiation was 3 or smaller. Found and reported by Zili KOU, Wenjian HE, Sharad Sinha, and Wei ZHANG. See "Cache Side-channel Attacks and Defenses of the Sliding Window Algorithm in TEEs" - Design, Automation and Test in Europe 2023." was this issue solved in this version?

2 years, 1 month

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ECDSA read_signature returns "invalid signature" status

by Tilen Majerle

Hello, I have 3rd party custom ECC library, that can do ECDSA verification and uses secp256r1 compressed public key (33bytes) to do so - all works fine. Now I want to migrate to mbedTLS, to also benefit of other crypto schemes, hence use of mbedtls ECDSA was a natural way to go. Here I need (as I understand) PEM parser or optionally public key in uncompressed format (0x04 | X | Y). Problem is that loading of the key seems to work (func returns 0), but verification fails with -20450, indicating (if I well understood) invalid signature. Test data. PRIVATE KEY: -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQgKNqyWso/lMuTlTE6 ll47Jboqq/Iz7OYDrr7TuXN+s2ChRANCAARNgfaUcxLoWWG01ekJFiqB8ujMgnHz P320ZgiZErH6zKjlB9EovIHrchj0240+EIpFios+2uM609FgRvu3+NrT -----END PRIVATE KEY----- PUBLIC KEY: -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- MDkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDIgADTYH2lHMS6FlhtNXpCRYqgfLozIJx 8z99tGYImRKx+sw= -----END PUBLIC KEY----- PUBLIC KEY UNCOMPRESSED SEC1: 0x4,0x4d,0x81,0xf6,0x94,0x73,0x12,0xe8,0x59,0x61,0xb4,0xd5,0xe9,0x9,0x16,0x2a,0x81,0xf2,0xe8,0xcc,0x82,0x71,0xf3,0x3f,0x7d,0xb4,0x66,0x8,0x99,0x12,0xb1,0xfa,0xcc,0xa8,0xe5,0x7,0xd1,0x28,0xbc,0x81,0xeb,0x72,0x18,0xf4,0xdb,0x8d,0x3e,0x10,0x8a,0x45,0x8a,0x8b,0x3e,0xda,0xe3,0x3a,0xd3,0xd1,0x60,0x46,0xfb,0xb7,0xf8,0xda,0xd3 PUBLIC KEY COMPRESSED SEC1: 0x3,0x4d,0x81,0xf6,0x94,0x73,0x12,0xe8,0x59,0x61,0xb4,0xd5,0xe9,0x9,0x16,0x2a,0x81,0xf2,0xe8,0xcc,0x82,0x71,0xf3,0x3f,0x7d,0xb4,0x66,0x8,0x99,0x12,0xb1,0xfa,0xcc INPUT STRING in TEXT format: "This is my input data" (remove quotes) INPUT STRING in HEX format: 0x54,0x68,0x69,0x73,0x20,0x69,0x73,0x20,0x6d,0x79,0x20,0x69,0x6e,0x70,0x75,0x74,0x20,0x64,0x61,0x74,0x61 SHA256 of INPUT STRING: 0xa7,0x3f,0x26,0xf4,0xa1,0xe4,0x61,0x61,0x0,0x1a,0x29,0xdf,0xd2,0xaf,0x7d,0xa,0x25,0x91,0xbb,0xcc,0x1f,0xbc,0xfb,0xdb,0x43,0xdb,0x57,0xf9,0x8d,0x94,0xeb,0x81 (x-checked here: https://emn178.github.io/online-tools/sha256.html) SIGNATURE of HASH signed with PRIVATE KEY: 0x80,0xe6,0xf5,0x97,0x6a,0x66,0xa2,0xe2,0x9a,0xd7,0x7f,0x9a,0x9b,0x3e,0x2b,0xde,0x1f,0x7c,0x3,0xb3,0x1,0xb8,0x6f,0xd8,0xf6,0xf,0x27,0x38,0x63,0x3,0x54,0x74,0x76,0x6d,0x1b,0x97,0xf0,0xbc,0xc5,0xd2,0x4b,0xae,0xf0,0x34,0xab,0x86,0xbd,0x55,0x0,0x8a,0x4c,0x9f,0x4e,0xa5,0x53,0x89,0xe8,0x0,0xb9,0x83,0x24,0x87,0x98,0x1 My custom library code looks like - this one works as expected: if (ecdsa_verify(public_key_compressed_33_bytes_array, hash_of_input_string, signature_signed_with_private_key)) { printf("Custom ECDSA lib verification is OK\r\n"); } My mbedTLS code looks like: ``` /* mbedTLS */ printf("mbedTLS way start\r\n"); mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&ctx); mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&ctx.private_grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1); res = mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(&ctx.private_grp, &ctx.private_Q, ecc_public_key_uncompressed_bin, sizeof(ecc_public_key_uncompressed_bin)); if (res != 0) { printf("ECP point read binary failed: %d\r\n", res); } res = mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature(&ctx, data_raw_hash_digest, sizeof(data_raw_hash_digest), signature, sizeof(signature)); if (res == 0) { printf("mbedTLS Verification is OK...\r\n"); } else { printf("mbedTLS Verification failed...: %d\r\n", res); } printf("mbedTLS way end\r\n"); ``` and it always fails with error code -20450. while loading keys function goes through well. Am I wrongly loading the keys?

2 years, 1 month

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