I have an application using mbedTls 2.9.0 that's been running successfully for a few years. It secures connections for the AWS MQTT broker, for https GET/PUT transfers, and for SSL/TLS email servers - But only one secure connection at a time. I need to add support for an FTPS client. This requires opening/securing a control channel on port 21, then opening/securing a second port for data transfer.
Opening/securing the control channel works as expected. Then, when the client calls connect() for the data transfer socket, the server log shows messages indicating it is preparing for a TLS handshake.
Now, here's where I may be missing something... The client calls the same code as for the control connection: Allocates a second mbedtls_ssl_context, mbedtls_ssl_config, mbedtls_x509_crt, et.al, and calls some mbedtls_ssl_*() functions which were copy/pasted from example code several years ago. The server name and root cert are the same. I think the only difference in the second negotiation is the underlying socket descriptor allocated by the IP stack for the data channel.
When mbedtls_ssl_handshake() is called, both the filezilla log and client log show a successful handshake. The filezilla log then shows it trying to establish yet another secure data connection, which fails, and reports "TLS session of data connection not resumed."
Questions:
-- Is the above sequence correct for opening and securing a second connection?
-- In searching through ssl.h I see mbedtls_ssl_get_session() and mbedtls_ssl_set_session(). Are these relevant to the situation? I cannot tell from their one-sentence descriptions.
Hi
I just needed to use rsa.c but its a little complicated.
Can anyone help me or give me any document about how i can use it without use of tls.
I just saw a doc on tls.mbed.org but the site is not working anymore.
Hello,
currently, I am evaluating the mbed-tls. I already created some smaller demos regarding AES and RSA. I do so on a PC with cygwin and with Keil micro vision for a NXP S32K144.
One demo is just validating some data with a signature and an existing public key. Here is the point that puzzles me a bit. As far as I understand this cybersecurity stuff entropy is not needed for the above use case. Some of my colleagues would agree with me.
Once psa_crypto_init() is called on a target NXP S32K144 the function returns PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY.
So far so good
https://os.mbed.com/docs/mbed-os/v6.15/porting/entropy-sources.html
gives the hints on how to handle this in general but I did not find any information on how to disable the "request for entropy" in a save way once your use case does not need any new secrets.
Can you give me a hint why psa_crypto_init() is implemented that way?
It may also be that I still have a conceptual understanding problem!?
Regards
Heico
Hi mbed-tls Team,
PSA crypto API for HW acceleration seems pretty new.
Question1: is there some reference code or project I could poke around to see how it is being used?
Currently I have added (locally) a set of driver to make use of our HW crypto using the *_ALT way (the old way?) and for what I understand, the PSA API is the "new way" to do things.
But It is still unclear how vendor do upstream there HW acceleration drivers.
If this part is kept in another repo, then the mbedTLS build does not have any "hooks" to pull-in the vendor specific code to build the mbedTLS library with.
The current implementation seems to be agnostic to any vendor specific HW so I am wondering if there is a "standard" way for vendor to upstream their mbedTLS HW acceleration code that would be built as part of mbedTLS library.
I have posted a similar thread to the "issue" ticket of the mbedtls repo for reference: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/5975
Thanks for any feedback/pointers/ideas.
Regards,
-Mathieu
Hi All,
My target has 128k SRAM which has about 60k spare, and 64k CCM which
is allocated whole to FreeRTOS stacks etc (its private heap, memory
model #4).
I am running a simplified HTTP server (for local config etc), which
uses fairly minimal RAM (a few k), and an HTTPS/TLS client which uses
about 50k (for its private heap).
So if both of the above are running concurrently, there is only ~10k
RAM left, but it does work, but when TLS is doing its
handshake/negotiation (which on a 168MHz 32F417 takes 2-3 seconds) the
HTTP server temporarily hangs.
Investigating this, it appears that LWIP is running out of buffers
during TLS and is rejecting incoming packets.
I don't really want to change the CPU to the next one up which has
another 64k RAM, because a) I have stock of the 417 and this took
about a year to get, b) the design is rock solid and I don't want to
tempt fate (there is a lot of subtle hardware usage e.g. DAC ADC DMA
timers) even though in theory it should be just alternate function pin
changes, c) some versions of the product may not need TLS at all.
I have an option of an 8 megabyte SPI-attached RAM
https://www.eevblog.com/forum/microcontrollers/lyontek-ly68l6400-8-megabyte…
which does work and is not bad at $3 (there are cheaper 128kbyte
versions too), but obviously cannot be addressed as normal RAM. The
ESP32 can do that but the 32F4 can't.
Does anyone know enough about the internals of MbedTLS, or even LWIP,
to know whether the memory usage structure lends itself to this kind
of "overlay" memory? One can read or write say 1k bytes in 400us, in
my target (21MHz SPI with DMA). Obviously this would be horribly
inefficient for a byte at a time emulation but perhaps one can switch
buffers in and out...
Thank you in advance. If somebody knows of a concrete route, I am
happy to pay for the time.
Regards,
Peter
Hi All, This is a gentle reminder that the next MBed TLS Tech forum is next
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know. :) Best regards, Don
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Hi all,
We're seeking feedback on our plans regarding support for Finite-Field DHE (also known as FFDH(E), as opposed to the Elliptic Curve version, ECDH(E)).
Currently the PSA Crypto API only supports FFDH with named groups, which aligns well with modern cryptographic practice and the needs of TLS 1.3, but less well with TLS 1.2 where arbitrary parameters can be chosen by the server, leading to various interoperability and security issues (see the introduction of RFC 7919, hence the general move to named groups).
Some data suggests that FFDH is already seeing very little use (less than 1% of TLS 1.2 traffic) on major websites, and presumably this would be even less when constrained devices are involved, since ECDH is less resource-intensive.
So, we are currently planning on removing support for DHE-RSA and DHE-PSK key exchanges in TLS 1.2 in the next major version of Mbed TLS. We would retain support of ECDHE in TLS 1.2, and of DHE (in addition to ECDHE) in TLS 1.3. (Support for FFDH in TLS 1.2 would also be present in the LTS version released around the same time as the next major version.)
If you have any objection to this plan, please let us know about your use case and motivations, either by responding to this email, or by commenting on the corresponding github issue: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/5278 Thank you!
Best regards,
Manuel for the Mbed TLS team.
Hi,
I have one root ca, intermediate ca, and device certificate in der format.
While am trying to verify one by one as intermediate-ca with root-ca and device cert with intermediate-ca; things work fine.
But if I tried to verify like having two context one for ca and one chain. I parse root ca on CA context and intermediate ca and device cert on chain context. Now verification fails with flag 8 error code -0x2700.
I have attached verify_der_one_by_one.c it is working without any issue; but verify_der_chain.c is causing the issue stated above.
Any help would be appreciated.
Thanks,
Gopi Krishnan
Hello,
Mbed TLS supports AES acceleration with VIA Padlock (MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C).
We do not have the hardware to test it, so this should be considered
strictly community-maintained.
We are making a patch to the AES module which has a small risk of
breaking VIA padlock support:
https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/pull/5896 . If you are using VIA
padlock, please test this change and let us know if something's wrong.
On a related note, we intend to drop the Padlock code in the next major
version of Mbed TLS (https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/5903).
If you care about this feature, please let us know.
Best regards,
--
Gilles Peskine
Mbed TLS developer