- mbed-tls - lists.trustedfirmware.org

Looking for suggestions about make Mbed TLS APIs non-secure callable APIs on armv8m

by Lee, William

Hi Mbed TLS, I am looking for some suggestions about make some (or all) Mbed TLS APIs non-secure callable APIs on armv8m. The background is that I am going to have a secure firmware that provides encryption services by building part (or whole) of Mbed TLS into that firmware and make those original mbedtls_x APIs non-secure callable, so the existing non-secure firmware could link those non-secure callable APIs and use them. Some of my thoughts: (1) The easiest way to do it I can think of is just add the attribute "cmse_nonsecure_call" to those APIs' declaration (or use a macro to wrap the attribute for conditional build to not impact others don't want it), but I do not think this modification could be accepted by upstream 🙂. (2) So my another thought is duplicate all header files and put them under another folder, assuming it is my-include folder, then I can do whatever I want to my-include folder, but there is also a problem I can think of: a merge/compare burden between include and my-include folder after I have updated Mbed TLS. I really appreciate other suggestions! Thanks, William

1 year, 1 month

3
3
0 0

Reminder: MBed TLS Tech Forum - US/Europe

by Don Harbin

Hi All, A gentle reminder that the US-Europe timezone-friendly MBed TLS Tech forum is next Monday at 4:30pm UK time. Invite details can be found on the online calendar here <https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/>. If you have any topics, please let Janos know. :) Don

1 year, 1 month

1
0
0 0

Setting ciphersuite causes MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER

by Mbed TLS

My mbedtls client has been working for 2 years. It did what I required and has been stable. However, I now need to force a new server to use my preferred cipher suite. I found the helper function to force the cipher suite here: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/blob/de4d5b78558666d2e258d95e6c5875f9c7… I added mbedtls_ssl_conf_preference_order(conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_CLIENT) to the end of the function to force the server to choose my ciphersuite. Prior to this change I called the mbedtls functions in this chronological order: mbedtls_ssl_init(&_ssl); mbedtls_ssl_config_init(&_conf); mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(&_ctr_drbg); mbedtls_entropy_init(&_entropy); mbedtls_x509_crt_init(&_cacert); mbedtls_pk_init(&_pkey); mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain mbedtls_ssl_setup mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname and then proceed to call: mbedtls_ssl_set_bio mbedtls_ssl_handshake Now: If I call mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites BEFORE mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults, the ciphersuite list is ignored/seems to get overriden. If I call mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites AFTER mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults, my ciphersuite list changes are accepted and transmitted (I can see in Wireshark). The server then responds agreeing to use my chosen cipher suite. However, mbedtls_ssl_handshake returns with value -26112, which I have looked up to be MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER. Unfortunately I have no clue what is causing this. Could somebody please advise how this should be done? I can see Client2 example but there are functions I have which are not in there. Client1 seems too simple for me but Client2 seems beyond what I require.

1 year, 1 month

2
5
0 0

Connect using IP address instead of URL "509 - Certificate verification failed, e.g. CRL, CA or signature check failed"

by M M

I am using MbedTLS client code based on this: https://github.com/machinezone/IXWebSocket/blob/master/ixwebsocket/IXSocket… I am connecting to a server via it's URL. However, I would like to connect directly using an IP address returned from running the traceroute command on the URL. So I replaced the URL with the IP address. However, MBedTLS fails on the handshake: https://github.com/machinezone/IXWebSocket/blob/master/ixwebsocket/IXSocket… I get the error: "error in handshake : X509 - Certificate verification failed, e.g. CRL, CA or signature check failed" If I revert back to URL, it works. The IP address does exist. How can I connect using the IP address, instead of the URL?

1 year, 1 month

3
3
0 0

Re: mbedtls and PQC algorithms support

by Raunak Gupta

Micron Confidential Hi, I find that mbed-tls already support LMS, could you please Point to some reference and starting from which version mbedTLS lib version supports LMS? Best Regards, Raunak Get Outlook for iOS<https://aka.ms/o0ukef> Micron Confidential

1 year, 1 month

2
1
0 0

Re: [EXT] RE: Inquiry About PQC Cryptos in embedTLS Library

by Raunak Gupta

Micron Confidential Dear MbedTLS, Can you please help to provide some references for LMS stateful signatures schemes support in MbedTLS, May be something like documentation and github repo link? Unfortunately I am not able to find it online? Thanks, Raunak Get Outlook for iOS<https://aka.ms/o0ukef> Micron Confidential ________________________________ From: Shebu Varghese Kuriakose <Shebu.VargheseKuriakose(a)arm.com> Sent: Tuesday, September 3, 2024 8:48 PM To: Raunak Gupta <raunakgupta(a)micron.com>; enquiries(a)trustedfirmware.org <enquiries(a)trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [EXT] RE: Inquiry About PQC Cryptos in embedTLS Library Micron Confidential CAUTION: EXTERNAL EMAIL. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and were expecting this message. Hi Raunak, Mbed TLS today supports LMS stateful hash-based signature scheme. While supporting other PQC algorithms is in the Mbed TLS project roadmap, the team isn’t actively working on it. The focus for the team now is preparing for Mbed TLS 4.0. Feel free to ask any further technical questions in the Mbed TLS public mailing list - mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org> (https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman3/lists/mbed-tls.lists.trustedfirm…) Regards, Shebu Micron Confidential From: 'Raunak Gupta' via TFenquiries <enquiries(a)trustedfirmware.org> Sent: Tuesday, September 3, 2024 2:34 AM To: enquiries(a)trustedfirmware.org Subject: Inquiry About PQC Cryptos in embedTLS Library Micron Confidential Dear Trusted Firmware Team, I hope this message finds you well. My name is Raunak, and I am a Security Engineer at Micron Technology. I would like to inquire whether the embedTLS library has been updated to include Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms such as LMS, HSS, and XMSS. Additionally, is the embedTLS team actively working on integrating these PQC algorithms? Thank you for your assistance. Best regards, Raunak Micron Confidential To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to enquiries+unsubscribe(a)trustedfirmware.org<mailto:enquiries+unsubscribe@trustedfirmware.org>.

1 year, 1 month

1
0
0 0

Mbed TLS 3.6.1 and 2.28.9

by David Horstmann

Dear Mbed TLS users, We have released Mbed TLS versions 3.6.1 and 2.28.9. These releases provide bugfixes, security fixes and minor improvements. The 3.6.1 release includes fixes for issues caused by enabling TLS 1.3 for TLS connections in the default configuration. Full details are available in the release notes: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/mbedtls-2.28.9 https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/mbedtls-3.6.1 We recommend all users to consider whether they are impacted, and to upgrade appropriately. Many thanks, David Horstmann Mbed TLS developer

1 year, 2 months

1
0
0 0

Mbed TLS 4.0 roadmap and bignum/ecp API

by Gernot Kvas

Hi all, From the announcement and also the long term plans (https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/project/long-term-plans/) it is apparent that bignum/ecp operations on the public API will go away and usage will be restricted to internal only. I do understand and welcome the shift towards PSA API and to abandon the ALT interface for higher level legacy API crypto functions. However, I'm not so positive about removal of the bignum and ecp API. There are projects using those functions even in their PSA porting layer (Matter comes to mind: https://github.com/project-chip/connectedhomeip/blob/master/src/crypto/CHIP…) or projects using the bignum layer as abstraction (Zephyr hostap/wpa_supplicant: https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/hostap/tree/main/src/crypto, crypto_mbedtls*.c). There might be a case to support those functions to have (hardware-accelerated) low level building blocks for algorithms Mbed TLS doesn't yet or never will support. As other SSL libraries such as OpenSSL also expose similar API (BN_ and EC_POINT_ ), the removal in Mbed TLS will certainly leave a gap. What's the view here from the project team? Cheers, Gernot

1 year, 2 months

2
1
0 0

Requesting information for mbed-tls commercial license & support

by Kumar, Praveen

Hi, We are in the process of qualifying a suitable encryption library for our pre-hospital patient monitor and the telemedicine system. I am writing to request your guidance regarding the mbed-tls use for commercial purposes. I look forward to your response. Regards, Praveen Kumar R&D Project Manager Emergency Care Professional (EC-Pro) Philips Tel +44 (0) 1256 362427 Email praveen.m.kumar(a)philips.com<mailto:praveen.m.kumar@philips.com> Remote Diagnostic Technologies Limited. Registered office: Ascent 1, Farnborough Aerospace Centre, Aerospace Boulevard, Farnborough GU14 6XW, UK. Registered in England No. 3321782. [Logo Description automatically generated]<http://www.philips.com/> Connect with Philips [cid:image002.gif@01DAE7F8.0802FC50]<https://www.linkedin.com/company/philips/>[cid:image003.gif@01DAE7F8.0802FC50]<https://twitter.com/PhilipsHealth>[cid:image004.gif@01DAE7F8.0802FC50]<https://www.youtube.com/PhilipsHealthcare/videos> ________________________________ The information contained in this message may be confidential and legally protected under applicable law. The message is intended solely for the addressee(s). If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, forwarding, dissemination, or reproduction of this message is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by return e-mail and destroy all copies of the original message.

1 year, 2 months

3
6
0 0

Major changes in Mbed TLS 4.0

by Gilles Peskine

Hello, Following consultations with the community and internal discussions among the Mbed TLS maintenance team, we can now present the major changes that will happen in the next major version of Mbed TLS. Our plan remains to release in the second quarter of 2025. The next major version will focus on two things: 1. The cryptography library will be a separate product called TF-PSA-Crypto 1.0. The X.509 and TLS library will be called Mbed TLS 4.0, and will rely on TF-PSA-Crypto for all cryptographic functionality. 2. This release completes the migration of cryptography APIs from classic mbedtls APIs to PSA APIs. Please find more information below about what this means in practice. What follows are just headlines, not an exhaustive list of changes. We expect many small changes that do not affect major functionality. Please note that the changes presented here are our current plan. We may revise it based on new inputs, new insights or unexpected hurdles. You can follow the advancement of the design, planning and development of the next release on the 4.0+1.0 planning board at https://github.com/orgs/Mbed-TLS/projects/15/views/1 . Removal of legacy APIs The following low-level application interfaces will no longer be present in the API of TF-PSA-Crypto 1.0 and Mbed TLS 4.0: * Hashes: hkdf.h, md5.h, ripemd160.h, sha1.h, sha3.h, sha256.h, sha512.h; * Random generation: ctr_drbg.h, hmac_drbg.h, entropy.h; * Ciphers and modes: aes.h, aria.h, camellia.h, chacha20.h, chachapoly.h, cipher.h, cmac.h, gcm.h, poly1305.h; * Private key encryption mechanisms: pkcs5.h, pkcs12.h. * Asymmetric cryptography: bignum.h, dhm.h, ecdh.h, ecdsa.h, ecjpake.h, ecp.h, rsa.h. The cryptographic mechanisms remain present, but they will only be accessible via the PSA API (psa_xxx functions introduced gradually starting with Mbed TLS 2.17). If you maintain code that uses these interfaces, you can already start migrating it today, since almost all PSA interfaces are available in the mbedtls-3.6 long-time support branch (and many even in 2.28 LTS). Please consult the PSA transition guide https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/blob/mbedtls-3.6/docs/psa-transition.md for guidance. Some non-PSA crypto interfaces will still be present in TF-PSA-Crypto 1.0: * pk.h will remain with some changes, mainly to provide an interface to key parsing and formatting which does not have a PSA equivalent yet. * md.h will remain as a thin layer over PSA hash functions (not HMAC) to ease the transition. * nist_kw.h will remain because it does not have a PSA equivalent yet. Removal of legacy integration interfaces TF-PSA-Crypto 1.0 and Mbed TLS 4.0 will no longer support MBEDTLS_xxx_ALT replacement of functions and modules. Use PSA transparent drivers instead. TF-PSA-Crypto 1.0 and Mbed TLS 4.0 will no longer support MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT and MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C. Use PSA opaque drivers instead. TF-PSA-Crypto 1.0 and Mbed TLS 4.0 will no longer have the mbedtls/entropy.h interface to configure entropy sources. This will be replaced by PSA random drivers. In addition, we are planning to rework the platform abstraction layer (MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_xxx configuration options). More details will be available in the coming months. Removal of legacy mechanisms The following cryptographic mechanisms are planned to be removed in TF-PSA-Crypto 1.0 and Mbed TLS 4.0: * DES (including 3DES). * PKCS#1v1.5 encryption/decryption (RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5). (OAEP, PSS, and PKCS#1v1.5 signature are staying.) * Finite-field Diffie-Hellman with custom groups. (RFC 7919 groups remain supported.) * Elliptic curves of size 225 bits or less. The following cipher suites are planned to be removed from (D)TLS 1.2 in Mbed TLS 4.0: * TLS_RSA_* (including TLS_RSA_PSK_*), i.e. cipher suites using RSA decryption. (RSA signatures, i.e. TLS_ECDHE_RSA_*, are staying.) * TLS_ECDH_*, i.e. cipher suites using static ECDH. (Ephemeral ECDH, i.e. TLS_ECDHE_*, is staying.) * TLS_DHE_*, i.e. cipher suites using finite-field Diffie-Hellman. (Ephemeral ECDH, i.e. TLS_ECDHE_*, is staying.) * TLS_*CBC*, i.e. all cipher suites using CBC. Non-functional changes Due to the separation into two separate products (TF-PSA-Crypto and Mbed TLS), there will be major changes to the directory structure and to the build system. We plan to use CMake as the primary build system. Since TF-PSA-Crypto is a new product, identifiers that are not PSA interfaces (such as optimisation options and platform interfaces) will be renamed with a new prefix. Best regards, -- Gilles Peskine Mbed TLS developer

1 year, 2 months

3
4
0 0

2025

2024

2023

2022

2021

2020

mbed-tls