- mbed-tls - lists.trustedfirmware.org

3.0 plans: remove old TLS options from the code base entirely

by Manuel Pegourie-Gonnard

Hi all, As a general rule I'll start a thread of each of the changes to be discussed for inclusion in Mbed TLS 3.0, but as an exception to that rule, I'm grouping several items here because I suspect they probably won't generate much discussion (if any). Note: in general we keep obsolete crypto primitives in the code base (disabled by default at compile time), so that people can still use them to process old data at rest. This list however is about TLS options, i. e. handling live data in transit, so it makes sense to completely remove them from the code base once they're not used any more. It also decreases the complexity of the code base, hence improving its maintainability, testability and security. * Drop support for parsing SSLv2 ClientHello (`MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO`). This was only needed back when common frameworks (old version of Java most motably) used this format for ClientHellos for compatibility with old an buggy servers, and when people would actually consider negociating SSL 2.0. Fortunately, that's not the case any more. Also, removing this unblocks some much-needed refactorings and simplification of the code (and this option has become hard to test). * Drop support for SSLv3 (`MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3`). This version of the protocol was deprecated by the IETF (MUST NOT use since 2015 - RFC 7568) and is no longer widely used. * Drop support for compatibility with our own previous buggy implementation of truncated HMAC (`MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT`). This is only useful for people who want to interoperate with buggy pre-2.7 Mbed TLS. Since those versions are no longer maintained, hopefully everyone has updated by now. * Drop support for TLS record-level compression (`MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT`). There are potential security issues with this option (compression if any should be done at the appplication level in order to separate secrets from attacker-controlled content), it's not widely used, and was removed in TLS 1.3. * Drop RC4 ciphersuites. These have been prohibited by RFC 7465 since 2015. (Note: as a bonus, we can then remove the config.h option `MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES` as well.) * Drop the single-DES ciphersuites. 56-bit keys, need I say more? * Support for SSL record hardware acceleration (`MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL`). Nobody in the team knows how it's supposed to work, it's entirely untested, and we think nobody uses it, it's been failing to build for a while and nobody complained so far. (Note: we still fixed the bug, see PR #2262.) Do you agree with the above list? Are you (or people you know) using one of those features? Would you add things to that list (keeping the focus on SSL/TLS obsolete features for now)? Thanks in advance for sharing your thoughts! Regards, Manuel.

6 years, 6 months

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Re: [mbed-tls] Plans for Mbed TLS 3.0

by Manuel Pegourie-Gonnard

Hi again, Note: I've created a wiki page [1] to summarize and consolidate the results of the discussions that will be happening here about Mbed TLS 3.0. [1]: https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/mbed-tls/tech-plans-3.0/ I also wanted to note that the current goals, as announced yesterday, contain some changes compared to what had been announced nearly one year ago [2], so I'd like to briefly recap what changed and what didn't. [2]: https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/blog/working-towards-mbed-tls-3 Preparing a future based on PSA Crypto -------------------------------------- We remain committed to that, but are now taking a different route towards that goal. Initially we started to split Mbed Crypto out of Mbed TLS, which was not the clean split between PSA Crypto and TLS/X.509 than we want in the long run, so the plan was to evolve towards that. With the experience gained, we now think it's easier to evolve things in one place, so we merged back mbed-crypto into the mbedtls repo (see [3]), and still plan on making PSA Crypto its own product, but only when we're ready to make that split cleanly. [3]: https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/3064 Also, we initially hinted that the long-standing `mbedtls_` crypto APIs would be removed in Mbed TLS 3.0 (superseded by the PSA Crypto APIs). We're now considering a more gradual and hopefully more realistic transition where Mbed TLS 3.0 continues to offer some of those APIs for compatibility with existing code-bases, and they would only be actually removed in Mbed TLS 4.0. TLS 1.3 and message processing rework ------------------------------------- This is still not part of a realistic roadmap for Mbed TLS 3.0, but still close to our hearts for the future. Switching to a new licensing and contribution model --------------------------------------------------- This has been done already. The development branch now uses Apache 2.0 only, while the LTS branches are still dual-licensed Apache/GPL2. We moved away from a CLA and closer to an inbound == outbound model (not quite == yet because of the differences between development and LTS branches), see [4]. [4]: https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/3054 Opening up the governance of the project ---------------------------------------- This also happened already. Mbed TLS is now under open governance as part of the trustedfirmware.org structure. As a consequence of this move, Mbed TLS is now more focused on building and maintaining a healthy community of users, contributors and maintainers. Again, I hope that was clear and feel free to ask if you have any question or remark. I'll follow up by starting threads on more specific items. Regards, Manuel.

6 years, 6 months

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mbedTLS on ESP8266 SDK - memory issue?

by LockSafe

Hi. I have posted an issue I am having with the use of mbedTLS with ESP8266 SDK (it is freeRTOS based), I have posted my explanation in the link below, then their support asked me to send new questions to this email. If you have any doubt regarding my tests, or if you want I make more different tests, please don't hesitate do ask me. https://forums.mbed.com/t/mbedtls-on-esp8266-sdk-memory-issue/7913 Regards. <http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_cam…> Livre de vírus. www.avg.com <http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_cam…>. <#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2>

6 years, 6 months

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Plans for Mbed TLS 3.0

by Manuel Pegourie-Gonnard

Hi all, In the next few months we'll be preparing version 3.0 of Mbed TLS (with a goal of releasing in the 3rd quarter of calendar year 2020, see our roadmap [1]). [1]: https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/mbed-tls/roadmap/ We've been maintaining full API compatibility since Mbed TLS 2.0.0 was released in July of 2015, so this will be our first chance in 5 years to clean up any API that we've found not to be entirely satisfactory, or no longer needed. This is the first in a series of threads discussing what we would like to do in Mbed TLS 3.0 and how (or what we should rather postpone or not do at all). It will present the high-level goals and list some items as examples. Specific items that deserve further discussion (either to decide whether to include them in 3.0, or refine their scope or meaning) will be discussed each in their own thread. Clean up the code by removing old things ---------------------------------------- This facilitates maintenance and testing. Examples: - Remove support for SSL 3.0 and other deprecated protocol options. (But keep support for old crypto that could be useful for data at rest.) - Remove API functions that have been superseded. Improve existing APIs, behaviours, and defaults ----------------------------------------------- This is mainly small things we just couldn't do in the 2.x line due to our compatibility rules. Examples: - Upgrade the default TLS config to only offer (D)TLS 1.2 with forward-secure key exchanges and AEAD ciphers. - Add the 'const' qualifier to various arguments of existing APIs. - Add size arguments to existing APIs that lack such arguments. Reduce the surface of the public API ------------------------------------ This makes it easier to evolve the library while maintaining API compatibility, and also makes testing easier. Examples: - Forbid direct access to members of most (all?) structures. - Define more clearly which APIs are internal and forbid access to them. - Move some non-core modules that are only useful for examples out of the library (for example, certs.s). Prepare the migration to PSA Crypto ----------------------------------- Currently Mbed TLS consists of three libraries: SSL/(D)TLS, X.509, and Crypto. Furthermore, currently Crypto provides both the long-standing `mbedtls_` APIs and the new PSA Crypto APIs, and the TLS and X.509 libraries still largely rely on the `mbedtls_` APIs, as does probably a large amount of external code. Ultimately, we want to move to place where TLS and X.509 only rely on the PSA Crypto API (whose reference implementation will be independent and longer part of Mbed TLS), and where nobody uses the legacy `mbedtls_` APIs any more. But that's a goal for Mbed TLS 4.0. In the meantime, Mbed TLS 3.0 should pave the way for this. The most important thing we want to do in 3.0 is to make most of the low-level crypto modules internal, and only keep the high-level crypto modules to ease the migration for existing users of the `mbedtls_` crypto APIs. Concretely, this would mean for example that the `mbedtls_aes_` functions and types would no longer be part of the API, but using AES via the `mbedtls_cipher_` APIs would still be supported for existing users until Mbed TLS 4.0 - and of course using AES via the PSA Crypto API is the way forward. As this is a vast and complex topic, there will be a specific thread on where exactly we can and would like to draw the line of which crypto APIs are becoming private in Mbed TLS 3.0 and which are maintained until Mbed TLS 4.0 to ease migration. Note: this strongly overlaps with the previous section (reduce the surface of the public API), but the two are still distinct as they're guided by different incentives: general maintainability vs supporting a specific migration. I hope this email starts to clarify what Mbed TLS 3.0 should look like. Feel free to ask questions if anything's not clear, and again, there will be follow-up threads in the coming days and week to discuss specific aspects in more details. Best regards, Manuel (Mbed TLS developer)

6 years, 6 months

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Re: [mbed-tls] Static Memory allocation Buffer Size for DTLS #3146

by Manuel Pegourie-Gonnard

Hi Roshini, [please always repy to the list, this allows other people to help as well] > Thanks for your reply. >I am running into one weird issue in memory allocation part. Before moving to the issue, let me explain my configuration macros. > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN - Default value > I have enabled platform memory macros > > I have allocated heap memory of around 60KB, which I though is sufficient for DTLS. > I am using ecc based certificates. > And also my application contains CoAP secured using DTLS. > The issue is - > 1. I am sending coap request and I successfully obtain the response also. > I continue the above step for 3 times. 3rd time I am observing the debug message - "ssl_srv.c:3808: |1| mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret() returned -16 (-0x0010)". > The return code corresponds to memory allocation failure in BIGNUM. > To investigate further, I have customized my calloc function to print the function name - from which allocation failure is done. > I can see the memory allocation failure happened at API "mbedtls_mpi_grow". > > Further, I have increased the heap memory. But still issue is reproducing after certain number of iterations. > > Do you need to change any configuration setting? Not sure why this is happening? I am facing this issue for past 1 week. > It would be really helpful if you can guide me in this issue. If the connection is succeeding the first few times, and failing after a number of times with an out-of-memory message (and the larger the heap, the longer it goes before failing), to me this suggests two possible causes: 1. There could be a memory leak somewhere, in Mbed TLS or in other code used by your application. We do our best to avoid those in Mbed TLS, so I'd like to hope it's unlikely there is a leak in Mbed TLS, but it can't be completely excluded. If the core issue is a memory leak, it could also be in other parts of the code used by your application. One way to check for this would be to print out the current state of the allocator after each successful connection, and check if there is more memory still in use after each connection than after the previous connection. 2. Alternatively, if there is no leak, it could be that the heap is getting so fragmented that the allocator can't find enough consecutive space. Given that the failure happens in `mpi_grow()` which usually makes rather small allocations, that's probably not likely the issue here, but I thought I'd mention it for completeness. Regards, Manuel.

6 years, 6 months

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Re: [mbed-tls] Allowing unsupported extensions in X.509 certificates

by Gilles Peskine

On 03/04/2020 10:11, Hanno Becker via mbed-tls wrote: > Hi Lev, > > I believe that this kind of functionality could be implemented on top > of the existing > verify-with-callback API `mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_cb()`. More > precisely, > you can enable `MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION` > to ignore unknown extensions initially, and then chekc them yourself > in the > verification callback by manually > traversing `mbedtls_x509_crt::v3_ext`. If you detect > an extension you cannot make sense of and which is marked critical, > you can modify the > verification flags. > > Would that work for you, in principle? Note, though, that this would > work at the level > of verification, not parsing, which might or might not be acceptable. That's a possibility, but it's not very nice. It would be nicer if the library provided the extensions in a list, or provided an easy way to traverse them, which is the solution I'm currently leaning towards. > > In this regard you might also be interested in knowing about a > significant rewrite > of CRT parsing on the `baremetal` branch. The main difference is that > the X.509 CRT > structure has been stripped down to no longer make use of dynamically > allocated > memory but instead only provide pointers to the various fields in the > certificate. > In the case of dynamic-length fields such as the Subject or Issuer > names, but also > the extension list, inspection shall be done through a newline > introduced ASN.1 > parsing function > > int mbedtls_asn1_traverse_sequence_of( > unsigned char **p, > const unsigned char *end, > uint8_t tag_must_mask, uint8_t tag_must_val, > uint8_t tag_may_mask, uint8_t tag_may_val, > int (*cb)( void *ctx, int tag, > unsigned char* start, size_t len ), > void *ctx ); > > https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/blob/baremetal/include/mbedtls/asn1.h#L3… > > This function traverses an ASN.1 sequence and triggers a callback for > each item found. > This functionality could be used to perform the extension traversal in > the verification callback > or directly after parsing. > > Which extensions are you interested in, particularly, by the way? If > it is a standardized > extension, feel free to add support for it under a new compile-time > feature flag and > file a PR to add it. We do have to balance code size against the proliferation of compile-time options. A compile-time option dedicated for a specific extension is relatively easy to test (like we test the library with/without each cryptographic algorithm). But we should do this in a way that would work well if each extension is gated by a compile-time option, so let's please discuss the design first. -- Gilles Peskine Mbed TLS developer > > Cheers, > Hanno > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *From:* mbed-tls <mbed-tls-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on > behalf of Lev Stipakov via mbed-tls <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> > *Sent:* Friday, April 3, 2020 8:32 AM > *To:* mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> > *Subject:* Re: [mbed-tls] Allowing unsupported extensions in X.509 > certificates > > Hi, > > I am not too much into mbedTLS design and not sure if this would make > sense, > but what about if we introduce an API to let client decide, what to do > with unknown extensions? > > Let's provide a way for a client to specify a callback > > typedef int (*mbedtls_x509_crt_unsupported_extension_cb_t)( > const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid ); > > which could be an argument to a new method > > int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_with_ext_cb( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, > const unsigned char *buf, > size_t buflen, > > mbedtls_x509_crt_unsupported_extension_cb_t f_ext_cb ); > > > which is called when parser encounters unsupported extension: > > /* > * Detect supported extensions > */ > ret = mbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_type( &extn_oid, &ext_type ); > if( ret != 0 ) > { > /* No parser found, skip extension */ > *p = end_ext_octet; > > if( is_critical ) > { > /* Data is marked as critical: ask client what to do */ > if( f_ext_cb != NULL ) > { > ret = f_ext_cb( &extn_oid ); > } > > /* Client is OK with unsupported critical extension, continue */ > if( ret == 0 ) > continue; > > return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + > MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ); > } > > continue; > } > > This would allow us to deprecate > MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION - > those clients which want to allow all extensions could pass a callback > which always returns 0. > > What do you think? > > -- > -Lev > -- > mbed-tls mailing list > mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/mbed-tls > IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are > confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended > recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose > the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or > copy the information in any medium. Thank you. > IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

6 years, 6 months

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Re: [mbed-tls] How to generate a certificate request with X.509 OID MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH

by Hanno Becker

Hi Thomas, Could you share the relevant piece of the code and perhaps the raw CSR data it generates? >From what you write, it looks like you have called `mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension()` with OID `MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH`, which isn't quite right: `mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension()` registers a single extension, and the TLS Web Server Authentication usage is one usage constraint within the ExtendedKeyUsage extension. I'd therefore expect that you have to call `mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension()` with `MBEDTLS_OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE` passing it the raw ASN.1 content of the ExtendedKeyUsage extension, part of which is `MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH`. To my knowledge, there is currently no API within Mbed TLS which helps you writing this ASN.1 content from a list of usage constraints, so you will need to build it manually. If you have trouble with that, let us know. Alternatively, you might copy it from any certificate you know which has the desired ExtendedKeyUsage. Apologies for this inconvenience, I do think it would be beneficial to have some helper function for writing such an important extension as ExtendedKeyUsage which doens't force users to hand-craft ASN.1. Best, Hanno ________________________________ From: mbed-tls <mbed-tls-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Thomas Volgmann via mbed-tls <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: Friday, April 3, 2020 9:01 AM To: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [mbed-tls] How to generate a certificate request with X.509 OID MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH Hello, I have a problem generating the following content in an certificate request : Requested Extensions: X509v3 Extended Key Usage: TLS Web Server Authentication X509v3 Basic Constraints: CA:FALSE The only thing I could produce was : Requested Extensions: X509v3 Key Usage: Digital Signature X509v3 Extended Key Usage: TLS Web Server Authentication: Can anybody help me with the function : mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension Mit freundlichen Grüßen Thomas Volgmann --------------------------------------- DSA-Volgmann Redcarstr. 20 53842 Troisdorf Tel: 02241 23416 11 Fax: 02241 23416 61 email : thomas.volgmann(a)dsa-volgmann.de<mailto:thomas.volgmann@dsa-volgmann.de> web: www.dsa-volgmann.de<http://www.dsa-volgmann.de/> --------------------------------------- IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

6 years, 6 months

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Re: [mbed-tls] Allowing unsupported extensions in X.509 certificates

by Hanno Becker

Hi Lev, I believe that this kind of functionality could be implemented on top of the existing verify-with-callback API `mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_cb()`. More precisely, you can enable `MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION` to ignore unknown extensions initially, and then chekc them yourself in the verification callback by manually traversing `mbedtls_x509_crt::v3_ext`. If you detect an extension you cannot make sense of and which is marked critical, you can modify the verification flags. Would that work for you, in principle? Note, though, that this would work at the level of verification, not parsing, which might or might not be acceptable. In this regard you might also be interested in knowing about a significant rewrite of CRT parsing on the `baremetal` branch. The main difference is that the X.509 CRT structure has been stripped down to no longer make use of dynamically allocated memory but instead only provide pointers to the various fields in the certificate. In the case of dynamic-length fields such as the Subject or Issuer names, but also the extension list, inspection shall be done through a newline introduced ASN.1 parsing function int mbedtls_asn1_traverse_sequence_of( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, uint8_t tag_must_mask, uint8_t tag_must_val, uint8_t tag_may_mask, uint8_t tag_may_val, int (*cb)( void *ctx, int tag, unsigned char* start, size_t len ), void *ctx ); https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/blob/baremetal/include/mbedtls/asn1.h#L3… This function traverses an ASN.1 sequence and triggers a callback for each item found. This functionality could be used to perform the extension traversal in the verification callback or directly after parsing. Which extensions are you interested in, particularly, by the way? If it is a standardized extension, feel free to add support for it under a new compile-time feature flag and file a PR to add it. Cheers, Hanno ________________________________ From: mbed-tls <mbed-tls-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Lev Stipakov via mbed-tls <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: Friday, April 3, 2020 8:32 AM To: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [mbed-tls] Allowing unsupported extensions in X.509 certificates Hi, I am not too much into mbedTLS design and not sure if this would make sense, but what about if we introduce an API to let client decide, what to do with unknown extensions? Let's provide a way for a client to specify a callback typedef int (*mbedtls_x509_crt_unsupported_extension_cb_t)( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid ); which could be an argument to a new method int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_with_ext_cb( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen, mbedtls_x509_crt_unsupported_extension_cb_t f_ext_cb ); which is called when parser encounters unsupported extension: /* * Detect supported extensions */ ret = mbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_type( &extn_oid, &ext_type ); if( ret != 0 ) { /* No parser found, skip extension */ *p = end_ext_octet; if( is_critical ) { /* Data is marked as critical: ask client what to do */ if( f_ext_cb != NULL ) { ret = f_ext_cb( &extn_oid ); } /* Client is OK with unsupported critical extension, continue */ if( ret == 0 ) continue; return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ); } continue; } This would allow us to deprecate MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION - those clients which want to allow all extensions could pass a callback which always returns 0. What do you think? -- -Lev -- mbed-tls mailing list mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/mbed-tls IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

6 years, 6 months

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Re: [mbed-tls] Allowing unsupported extensions in X.509 certificates

by Lev Stipakov

Hi, I am not too much into mbedTLS design and not sure if this would make sense, but what about if we introduce an API to let client decide, what to do with unknown extensions? Let's provide a way for a client to specify a callback typedef int (*mbedtls_x509_crt_unsupported_extension_cb_t)( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid ); which could be an argument to a new method int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_with_ext_cb( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen, mbedtls_x509_crt_unsupported_extension_cb_t f_ext_cb ); which is called when parser encounters unsupported extension: /* * Detect supported extensions */ ret = mbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_type( &extn_oid, &ext_type ); if( ret != 0 ) { /* No parser found, skip extension */ *p = end_ext_octet; if( is_critical ) { /* Data is marked as critical: ask client what to do */ if( f_ext_cb != NULL ) { ret = f_ext_cb( &extn_oid ); } /* Client is OK with unsupported critical extension, continue */ if( ret == 0 ) continue; return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ); } continue; } This would allow us to deprecate MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION - those clients which want to allow all extensions could pass a callback which always returns 0. What do you think? -- -Lev

6 years, 6 months

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How to generate a certificate request with X.509 OID MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH

by Thomas Volgmann

Hello, I have a problem generating the following content in an certificate request : Requested Extensions: X509v3 Extended Key Usage: TLS Web Server Authentication X509v3 Basic Constraints: CA:FALSE The only thing I could produce was : Requested Extensions: X509v3 Key Usage: Digital Signature X509v3 Extended Key Usage: TLS Web Server Authentication: Can anybody help me with the function : mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension Mit freundlichen Grüßen Thomas Volgmann --------------------------------------- DSA-Volgmann Redcarstr. 20 53842 Troisdorf Tel: 02241 23416 11 Fax: 02241 23416 61 email : thomas.volgmann(a)dsa-volgmann.de<mailto:thomas.volgmann@dsa-volgmann.de> web: www.dsa-volgmann.de<http://www.dsa-volgmann.de/> ---------------------------------------

6 years, 6 months

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