- OP-TEE - lists.trustedfirmware.org

by Robert Deliën

Hi, We are using op-tee 3.10 in our i.MX6UL-based product and we are running into a small problem we hope you can help us out with. Apologies for the large mail; It's mostly pictures. The nature of our product requires us to protect access to the display contents. To achieve this, we have added a display driver to op-tee and have allocated the frame buffers in op-tee too. We are conforming to the memory-map as layed out in .../core/arch/arm/include/mm/generic_ram_layout.h: TEE RAM layout without CFG_WITH_PAGER +----------------------------------+ <-- CFG_TZDRAM_START | TEE core secure RAM (TEE_RAM) | +----------------------------------+ | Trusted Application RAM (TA_RAM) | +----------------------------------+ | SDP test memory (optional) | +----------------------------------+ <-- CFG_TZDRAM_START + CFG_TZDRAM_SIZE +----------------------------------+ <-- CFG_SHMEM_START | Non-secure static SHM | +----------------------------------+ <-- CFG_SHMEM_START + CFG_SHMEM_SIZE With this memory map in mind, we came up with the following solution: +----------------------------------+ <-- CFG_DRAM_BASE | | | Non-secure memory | | | +----------------------------------+ <-- CFG_TZDRAM_START | TEE core secure RAM (TEE_RAM) | +----------------------------------+ | Trusted Application RAM (TA_RAM) | +----------------------------------+ <-- CFG_POS_SEC_FB0_START | Secure frame buffer 0 | +----------------------------------+ <-- CFG_POS_SEC_FB1_START | Secure frame buffer 1 | +----------------------------------+ <-- CFG_SHMEM_START (== CFG_TZDRAM_START + CFG_TZDRAM_SIZE) | Non-secure static SHM | +----------------------------------+ <-- Top of DDR (CFG_SHMEM_START + CFG_SHMEM_SIZE) CFG_DDR_SIZE = 0x10000000 CFG_SHMEM_SIZE = 0x00200000 CFG_SHMEM_START = ($(CFG_DRAM_BASE) + $(CFG_DDR_SIZE) - $(CFG_SHMEM_SIZE)) CFG_SEC_FB_SIZE = 0x00096000 CFG_POS_SEC_FB1_START = ($(CFG_SHMEM_START) - $(CFG_SEC_FB_SIZE)) CFG_POS_SEC_FB0_START = ($(CFG_POS_SEC_FB1_START) - $(CFG_SEC_FB_SIZE)) CFG_TZDRAM_START = ($(CFG_DRAM_BASE) + 0x0e000000) CFG_TZDRAM_SIZE = ($(CFG_SHMEM_START) - $(CFG_TZDRAM_START)) This solution keeps the frame buffers within the region CFG_TZDRAM_START:CFG_TZDRAM_SIZE, but when booting the system, we notice an overlap between TA_RAM and both frame buffer areas: D/TC:0 dump_mmap_table:732 type TA_RAM va 0x88c00000..0x8a8fffff pa 0x8e100000..0x8fdfffff size 0x01d00000 (pgdir) ... D/TC:0 dump_mmap_table:732 type RAM_SEC va 0x8ded4000..0x8df69fff pa 0x8fd6a000..0x8fdfffff size 0x00096000 (smallpg) D/TC:0 dump_mmap_table:732 type RAM_SEC va 0x8df6a000..0x8dffffff pa 0x8fcd4000..0x8fd69fff size 0x00096000 (smallpg) Without fully comprehending how memory is allocated, we fear that this situation will allow TA's to be loaded into these frame buffer areas. To mitigate this, we came up with this alternative: +----------------------------------+ <-- CFG_DRAM_BASE | | | Non-secure memory | | | +----------------------------------+ <-- CFG_TZDRAM_START | TEE core secure RAM (TEE_RAM) | +----------------------------------+ | Trusted Application RAM (TA_RAM) | +----------------------------------+ <-- CFG_POS_SEC_FB0_START (== CFG_TZDRAM_START + CFG_TZDRAM_SIZE) | Secure frame buffer 0 | +----------------------------------+ <-- CFG_POS_SEC_FB1_START | Secure frame buffer 1 | +----------------------------------+ <-- CFG_SHMEM_START | Non-secure static SHM | +----------------------------------+ <-- Top of DDR (CFG_SHMEM_START + CFG_SHMEM_SIZE) CFG_DDR_SIZE = 0x10000000 CFG_SHMEM_SIZE = 0x00200000 CFG_SHMEM_START = ($(CFG_DRAM_BASE) + $(CFG_DDR_SIZE) - $(CFG_SHMEM_SIZE)) CFG_SEC_FB_SIZE = 0x00096000 CFG_POS_SEC_FB1_START = ($(CFG_SHMEM_START) - $(CFG_SEC_FB_SIZE)) CFG_POS_SEC_FB0_START = ($(CFG_POS_SEC_FB1_START) - $(CFG_SEC_FB_SIZE)) CFG_TZDRAM_START = ($(CFG_DRAM_BASE) + 0x0e000000) CFG_TZDRAM_SIZE = ($(CFG_POS_SEC_FB0_START) - $(CFG_TZDRAM_START)) This solution puts the frame buffers outside the region CFG_TZDRAM_START:CFG_TZDRAM_SIZE so they no longer overlap with TA_RAM. However, when booting the system, op-tee panics: D/TC:0 dump_mmap_table:732 type RAM_SEC va 0x8c2d4000..0x8c369fff pa 0x8fd6a000..0x8fdfffff size 0x00096000 (smallpg) D/TC:0 dump_mmap_table:732 type RAM_SEC va 0x8c36a000..0x8c3fffff pa 0x8fcd4000..0x8fd69fff size 0x00096000 (smallpg) ... D/TC:0 dump_mmap_table:732 type TA_RAM va 0x8c400000..0x8dfd3fff pa 0x8e100000..0x8fcd3fff size 0x01bd4000 (smallpg) ... E/TC:0 0 check_phys_mem_is_outside:332 Non-sec mem (0x8fcd4000:0x12c000) overlaps map (type 12 0x8fd6a000:0x96000) E/TC:0 0 Panic at core/arch/arm/mm/core_mmu.c:336 <check_phys_mem_is_outside> E/TC:0 0 TEE load address @ 0x8e000000 E/TC:0 0 Call stack: E/TC:0 0 0x8e005621 E/TC:0 0 0x8e01d397 E/TC:0 0 0x8e005aaf E/TC:0 0 0x8e004da7 E/TC:0 0 0x8e000174 In this situation, the memory area intended for the frame buffers (0x8fd6a000:0x96000) is now implicitly regarded as non-secure RAM, regardless of us registering it as MEM_AREA_RAM_SEC in main.c: register_phys_mem(MEM_AREA_RAM_SEC, CFG_POS_SEC_FB0_START, CFG_SEC_FB_SIZE); register_phys_mem(MEM_AREA_RAM_SEC, CFG_POS_SEC_FB1_START, CFG_SEC_FB_SIZE); Could you please confirm (or deny) that our first solution is the proper way to allocate these secure frame buffers and that they will not be overwritten by the process of loading TAs? If this is not the proper way, could you give us some pointers on how to do this? We do not feel comfortable allocating such large areas on the heap because of good taste and because we're not sure yet whether or not there are additional alignment requirement for these frame buffers. Perhaps something similar to the Linux slab-allocator is available? Thank you in advance for your help. With kind regards, Robert Deliën.

3 years, 10 months

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[PATCH] optee: extend normal memory check to also write-through

by Andrey Zhizhikin

ARMv7 Architecture Reference Manual [1] section A3.5.5 details Normal memory type, together with cacheability attributes that could be applied to memory regions defined as "Normal memory". Section B2.1.2 of the Architecture Reference Manual [1] also provides details regarding the Memory attributes that could be assigned to particular memory regions, which includes the descrption of cacheability attributes and cache allocation hints. Memory type and cacheability attributes forms 2 separate definitions, where cacheability attributes defines a mechanism of coherency control rather than the type of memory itself. In other words: Normal memory type can be configured with several combination of cacheability attributes, namely: - Write-Through (WT) - Write-Back (WB) followed by cache allocation hint: - Write-Allocate - No Write-Allocate (also known as Read-Allocate) Those types are mapped in the kernel to corresponding macros: - Write-Through: L_PTE_MT_WRITETHROUGH - Write-Back Write-Allocate: L_PTE_MT_WRITEALLOC - Write-Back Read-Allocate: L_PTE_MT_WRITEBACK Current implementation of the op-tee driver takes in account only 2 last memory region types, while performing a check if the memory block is allocated as "Normal memory", leaving Write-Through allocations to be not considered. Extend verification mechanism to include also Normal memory regios, which are designated with Write-Through cacheability attributes. Link: [1]: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/ddi0406/cd Fixes: 853735e40424 ("optee: add writeback to valid memory type") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Andrey Zhizhikin <andrey.zhizhikin(a)leica-geosystems.com> --- drivers/tee/optee/call.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/call.c b/drivers/tee/optee/call.c index c981757ba0d4..8da27d02a2d6 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/call.c +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/call.c @@ -535,7 +535,8 @@ static bool is_normal_memory(pgprot_t p) { #if defined(CONFIG_ARM) return (((pgprot_val(p) & L_PTE_MT_MASK) == L_PTE_MT_WRITEALLOC) || - ((pgprot_val(p) & L_PTE_MT_MASK) == L_PTE_MT_WRITEBACK)); + ((pgprot_val(p) & L_PTE_MT_MASK) == L_PTE_MT_WRITEBACK) || + ((pgprot_val(p) & L_PTE_MT_MASK) == L_PTE_MT_WRITETHROUGH)); #elif defined(CONFIG_ARM64) return (pgprot_val(p) & PTE_ATTRINDX_MASK) == PTE_ATTRINDX(MT_NORMAL); #else -- 2.17.1

3 years, 10 months

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[GIT PULL] OP-TEE driver for v5.11

by Jens Wiklander

Hello arm-soc maintainers, Please pull this small patch which allows the OP-TEE driver to work with ARMv7 based single CPU systems. Thanks, Jens The following changes since commit 3cea11cd5e3b00d91caf0b4730194039b45c5891: Linux 5.10-rc2 (2020-11-01 14:43:51 -0800) are available in the Git repository at: git://git.linaro.org/people/jens.wiklander/linux-tee.git tags/optee-valid-memory-type-for-v5.11 for you to fetch changes up to 853735e404244f5496cdb6188c5ed9a0f9627ee6: optee: add writeback to valid memory type (2020-11-25 12:51:52 +0100) ---------------------------------------------------------------- Add writeback to valid OP-TEE shared memory types Allows OP-TEE to work with ARMv7 based single CPU systems by allowing writeback cache policy for shared memory. ---------------------------------------------------------------- Rui Miguel Silva (1): optee: add writeback to valid memory type drivers/tee/optee/call.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

3 years, 10 months

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[PATCH] optee: add writeback to valid memory type

by Rui Miguel Silva

Only in smp systems the cache policy is setup as write alloc, in single cpu systems the cache policy is set as writeback and it is normal memory, so, it should pass the is_normal_memory check in the share memory registration. Add the right condition to make it work in no smp systems. Fixes: cdbcf83d29c1 ("tee: optee: check type of registered shared memory") Signed-off-by: Rui Miguel Silva <rui.silva(a)linaro.org> --- drivers/tee/optee/call.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/call.c b/drivers/tee/optee/call.c index 20b6fd7383c5..c981757ba0d4 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/call.c +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/call.c @@ -534,7 +534,8 @@ void optee_free_pages_list(void *list, size_t num_entries) static bool is_normal_memory(pgprot_t p) { #if defined(CONFIG_ARM) - return (pgprot_val(p) & L_PTE_MT_MASK) == L_PTE_MT_WRITEALLOC; + return (((pgprot_val(p) & L_PTE_MT_MASK) == L_PTE_MT_WRITEALLOC) || + ((pgprot_val(p) & L_PTE_MT_MASK) == L_PTE_MT_WRITEBACK)); #elif defined(CONFIG_ARM64) return (pgprot_val(p) & PTE_ATTRINDX_MASK) == PTE_ATTRINDX(MT_NORMAL); #else -- 2.29.2

3 years, 10 months

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[PATCH] Properly check tee_shm buffer mmap offset

by gaoyusong

The memmap options in tee_shm_op_mmap were not being checked for all sets of possible crazy values. Fix this up by properly check tee_shm buffer offsets. Signed-off-by: gaoyusong <a869920004(a)163.com> --- drivers/tee/tee_shm.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/tee/tee_shm.c b/drivers/tee/tee_shm.c index 827ac3d..3f762c8 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/tee_shm.c +++ b/drivers/tee/tee_shm.c @@ -75,6 +75,16 @@ static int tee_shm_op_mmap(struct dma_buf *dmabuf, struct vm_area_struct *vma) { struct tee_shm *shm = dmabuf->priv; size_t size = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start; + unsigned long offset; + + /* Check dmabuffer mmap offset */ + if (vma->vm_pgoff > (~0UL >> PAGE_SHIFT)) + return -EINVAL; + + offset = vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT; + + if (offset > shm->size || size > shm->size - offset) + return -EINVAL; /* Refuse sharing shared memory provided by application */ if (shm->flags & TEE_SHM_USER_MAPPED) -- 1.8.3.1

3 years, 10 months

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[GIT PULL] AMDTEE driver fixes for v5.10

by Jens Wiklander

Hello arm-soc maintainers, Please pull these AMDTEE driver fixes which are needed when opening multiple contexts or file descriptors. Note that this isn't a usual Arm driver update. This targets x86/AMD instead, but is still part of the TEE subsystem. Thanks, Jens The following changes since commit bbf5c979011a099af5dc76498918ed7df445635b: Linux 5.9 (2020-10-11 14:15:50 -0700) are available in the Git repository at: git://git.linaro.org:/people/jens.wiklander/linux-tee.git tags/amdtee-fixes-for-5.10 for you to fetch changes up to be353be27874f40837327d9a39e3ad2149ab66d3: tee: amdtee: synchronize access to shm list (2020-11-09 08:59:00 +0100) ---------------------------------------------------------------- AMD-TEE driver bug fixes AMD-TEE driver keeps track of shared memory buffers and their corresponding buffer id's in a global linked list. These buffers are used to share data between x86 and AMD Secure Processor. This pull request fixes issues related to maintaining mapped buffers in a shared linked list. ---------------------------------------------------------------- Rijo Thomas (2): tee: amdtee: fix memory leak due to reset of global shm list tee: amdtee: synchronize access to shm list drivers/tee/amdtee/amdtee_private.h | 8 ++++---- drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++------- 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

3 years, 10 months

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[PATCH 0/2] AMD-TEE driver bug fixes

by Rijo Thomas

AMD-TEE driver keeps track of shared memory buffers and their corresponding buffer id's in a global linked list. These buffers are used to share data between x86 and AMD Secure Processor. This patchset fixes issues related to maintaining mapped buffers in a shared linked list. Rijo Thomas (2): tee: amdtee: fix memory leak due to reset of global shm list tee: amdtee: synchronize access to shm list drivers/tee/amdtee/amdtee_private.h | 8 ++++---- drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++------- 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) -- 2.17.1

3 years, 10 months

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Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop Tomorrow

by Shebu Varghese Kuriakose

Hi All, Gentle reminder about the Mbed TLS workshop tomorrow (Tuesday, November 3rd) from 2 to 6pm GMT. See agenda and zoom link here - https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/mbed-tls-workshop/ Thanks, Shebu -----Original Appointment----- From: Trusted Firmware Public Meetings <linaro.org_havjv2figrh5egaiurb229pd8c(a)group.calendar.google.com> Sent: Friday, October 23, 2020 12:32 AM To: Trusted Firmware Public Meetings; Shebu Varghese Kuriakose; mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; Don Harbin; psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; Dave Rodgman Subject: Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop When: Tuesday, November 3, 2020 2:00 PM-6:00 PM (UTC+00:00) Dublin, Edinburgh, Lisbon, London. Where: Zoom: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/95315200315?pwd=ZDJGc1BZMHZLV29DTmpGUllmMjB1UT… You have been invited to the following event. Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop When Tue Nov 3, 2020 7am – 11am Mountain Standard Time - Phoenix Where Zoom: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/95315200315?pwd=ZDJGc1BZMHZLV29DTmpGUllmMjB1UT… (map<https://www.google.com/maps/search/Zoom:+https:%2F%2Flinaro-org.zoom.us%2Fj…>) Calendar shebu.varghesekuriakose(a)arm.com<mailto:shebu.varghesekuriakose@arm.com> Who • Don Harbin - creator • shebu.varghesekuriakose(a)arm.com<mailto:shebu.varghesekuriakose@arm.com> • mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org> • psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:psa-crypto@lists.trustedfirmware.org> • dave.rodgman(a)arm.com<mailto:dave.rodgman@arm.com> more details »<https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=NHVvY2FxY2o4Njk3MWZkd…> Hi, Trustedfirmware.org community project would like to invite you to the Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop. The purpose of the workshop is to bring together the Mbed TLS community including maintainers, contributors and users to discuss * The future direction of the project and * Ways to improve community collaboration Here is the agenda for the workshop. Topic Time (in GMT) Welcome 2.00 - 2.10pm Constant-time code 2.10 – 2.30pm Processes - how does work get scheduled? 2.30 – 2.50pm PSA Crypto APIs 2.50 – 3.20pm PSA Crypto for Silicon Labs Wireless MCUs - Why, What, Where and When 3.20 – 3.50pm Break Roadmap, TLS1.3 Update 4.10 – 4.30pm Mbed TLS 3.0 Plans, Scope 4.30 – 5.00pm How do I contribute my first review and be an effective Mbed TLS reviewer 5.00 – 5.30pm Regards, Don Harbin Trusted Firmware Community Manager ==============Zoom details below:==================== Trusted Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting. Topic: Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop Time: Nov 3, 2020 02:00 PM Greenwich Mean Time Join Zoom Meeting https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/95315200315?pwd=ZDJGc1BZMHZLV29DTmpGUllmMjB1UT…<https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Flinaro-org.zoom.us%2Fj%2F9531520…> Meeting ID: 953 1520 0315 Passcode: 143755 One tap mobile +16699009128,,95315200315# US (San Jose) +12532158782,,95315200315# US (Tacoma) Dial by your location +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose) +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma) +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston) +1 646 558 8656 US (New York) +1 301 715 8592 US (Germantown) +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago) 888 788 0099 US Toll-free 877 853 5247 US Toll-free Meeting ID: 953 1520 0315 Find your local number: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/u/apL3hgti4<https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Flinaro-org.zoom.us%2Fu%2FapL3hgt…> Going (shebu.varghesekuriakose(a)arm.com<mailto:shebu.varghesekuriakose@arm.com>)? Yes<https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=RESPOND&eid=NHVvY2FxY2o4Njk3MW…> - Maybe<https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=RESPOND&eid=NHVvY2FxY2o4Njk3MW…> - No<https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=RESPOND&eid=NHVvY2FxY2o4Njk3MW…> more options »<https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=NHVvY2FxY2o4Njk3MWZkd…> Invitation from Google Calendar<https://www.google.com/calendar/> You are receiving this courtesy email at the account shebu.varghesekuriakose(a)arm.com<mailto:shebu.varghesekuriakose@arm.com> because you are an attendee of this event. To stop receiving future updates for this event, decline this event. Alternatively you can sign up for a Google account at https://www.google.com/calendar/ and control your notification settings for your entire calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organizer and be added to the guest list, or invite others regardless of their own invitation status, or to modify your RSVP. Learn More<https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding>.

3 years, 11 months

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[GIT PULL] OP-TEE use UUID API for v5.10

by Jens Wiklander

Hello arm-soc maintainers, Please pull this small patch which allows to hide uuit_t internals from the OP-TEE driver. I know it's a bit late for v5.10, if it's too late please queue it for v5.11 instead. Thanks, Jens The following changes since commit 9123e3a74ec7b934a4a099e98af6a61c2f80bbf5: Linux 5.9-rc1 (2020-08-16 13:04:57 -0700) are available in the Git repository at: git://git.linaro.org:/people/jens.wiklander/linux-tee.git tags/optee-use-uuid-api-for-v5.10 for you to fetch changes up to 57222a1be27e06ecb81cc2f945e897814d5f461c: tee: optee: Use UUID API for exporting the UUID (2020-10-13 08:03:18 +0200) ---------------------------------------------------------------- Use UUID API to export the UUID Uses export_uuid() to export and uuid_t to an u8 array instead of depending on the internals of uuid_t. ---------------------------------------------------------------- Andy Shevchenko (1): tee: optee: Use UUID API for exporting the UUID drivers/tee/optee/device.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

3 years, 11 months

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[PATCH] tee: optee: Set a flag to avoid memory leaks

by Wang, Xiaolei

When an rpc message to release memory is not received, a memory leak will occur, which should be released unreferenced object 0xffff00006871b580 (size 128): comm "swapper/0", pid 1, jiffies 4294892673 (age 428.192s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 80 b3 71 68 00 00 ff ff 00 e0 71 a8 00 00 00 00 ..qh......q..... 00 e0 71 68 00 00 ff ff 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 ..qh............ backtrace: [<00000000f0425299>] slab_post_alloc_hook+0x6c/0x338 [<000000004705f905>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x1d4/0x328 [<00000000773c66a0>] tee_shm_alloc+0x84/0x268 [<00000000ca052f98>] optee_handle_rpc+0x144/0x5a0 [<0000000015a8eebe>] optee_do_call_with_arg+0x14c/0x168 [<00000000d51ef0fd>] optee_open_session+0x12c/0x200 [<000000007146f51d>] tee_client_open_session+0x24/0x38 [<00000000ea2b35e7>] optee_enumerate_devices+0xa0/0x2c0 [<0000000068088775>] optee_probe+0x560/0x690 [<00000000ad1d997a>] platform_drv_probe+0x54/0xa8 [<00000000e11592d4>] really_probe+0x118/0x3e0 [<00000000dacd3142>] driver_probe_device+0x5c/0xc0 [<0000000077c13842>] device_driver_attach+0x74/0x80 [<00000000106ccc62>] __driver_attach+0x8c/0xd8 [<00000000e120c345>] bus_for_each_dev+0x7c/0xd8 [<00000000b79335f5>] driver_attach+0x24/0x30 Signed-off-by: Xiaolei Wang <xiaolei.wang(a)windriver.com<mailto:xiaolei.wang@windriver.com>> --- drivers/tee/optee/call.c | 7 ++++++- drivers/tee/optee/optee_private.h | 2 +- drivers/tee/optee/rpc.c | 4 +++- 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/call.c b/drivers/tee/optee/call.c index 20b6fd7383c5..522c133b9d95 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/call.c +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/call.c @@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ u32 optee_do_call_with_arg(struct tee_context *ctx, phys_addr_t parg) struct optee_rpc_param param = { }; struct optee_call_ctx call_ctx = { }; u32 ret; + unsigned int flags = 0; param.a0 = OPTEE_SMC_CALL_WITH_ARG; reg_pair_from_64(&param.a1, &param.a2, parg); @@ -153,9 +154,13 @@ u32 optee_do_call_with_arg(struct tee_context *ctx, phys_addr_t parg) param.a1 = res.a1; param.a2 = res.a2; param.a3 = res.a3; - optee_handle_rpc(ctx, &param, &call_ctx); + optee_handle_rpc(ctx, &param, &call_ctx, &flags); } else { ret = res.a0; + if (flags != 0x0) { + param.a0 = 2; + optee_handle_rpc(ctx, &param, &call_ctx, &flags); + } break; } } diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_private.h b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_private.h index 8b71839a357e..1c1d62e21141 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_private.h +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_private.h @@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ struct optee_call_ctx { }; void optee_handle_rpc(struct tee_context *ctx, struct optee_rpc_param *param, - struct optee_call_ctx *call_ctx); + struct optee_call_ctx *call_ctx, unsigned int *flags); void optee_rpc_finalize_call(struct optee_call_ctx *call_ctx); void optee_wait_queue_init(struct optee_wait_queue *wq); diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/rpc.c b/drivers/tee/optee/rpc.c index b4ade54d1f28..4e76c87b61f4 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/rpc.c +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/rpc.c @@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ static void handle_rpc_func_cmd(struct tee_context *ctx, struct optee *optee, * Result of RPC is written back into @param. */ void optee_handle_rpc(struct tee_context *ctx, struct optee_rpc_param *param, - struct optee_call_ctx *call_ctx) + struct optee_call_ctx *call_ctx, unsigned int *flags) { struct tee_device *teedev = ctx->teedev; struct optee *optee = tee_get_drvdata(teedev); @@ -410,6 +410,7 @@ void optee_handle_rpc(struct tee_context *ctx, struct optee_rpc_param *param, reg_pair_from_64(&param->a1, &param->a2, pa); reg_pair_from_64(&param->a4, &param->a5, (unsigned long)shm); + *flags = 0x1; } else { param->a1 = 0; param->a2 = 0; @@ -420,6 +421,7 @@ void optee_handle_rpc(struct tee_context *ctx, struct optee_rpc_param *param, case OPTEE_SMC_RPC_FUNC_FREE: shm = reg_pair_to_ptr(param->a1, param->a2); tee_shm_free(shm); + *flags = 0x0; break; case OPTEE_SMC_RPC_FUNC_FOREIGN_INTR: /* -- 2.25.1

3 years, 11 months

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OP-TEE