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Re: [TF-A] Does ARMv8 TrustZone provide a secure ROM?

by Olivier Deprez

Hi, To add to Dan's observation about rpi lacking TZ memory controller: Notice the first subsystem to boot on BCM SoC is the VideoCore (which itself releases ARM cores resets). Thus, there are early boot stages running even before TF-A gets handed over. So it needs trusting the VC ROM and VC bootloader (residing on SD card, or EEPROM from rpi4). As to whether those early components get verified by the BCM chip, this is not documented publicly AFAIK. I extrapolate "TPM does not work" means the "public rpi" is good for prototyping TZ and/or a TPM solution. Although it is eventually not directly usable as a production platform for such use cases. Regards, Olivier. ________________________________________ From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Dan Handley via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 08 January 2020 16:32 To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-A] Does ARMv8 TrustZone provide a secure ROM? (Back on the list) By rpi I guess you mean Raspberry Pi? > How do we ensure that the ROM is safe? I'm not sure what you mean by "safe". By definition the ROM is non-modifiable but maybe you also want it to be non-readable by normal world software? Although Raspberry Pi contains CPUs that implement TrustZone, I believe there is no TrustZone Controller IP policing access to memory so there is nothing preventing normal world software from accessing memory that is mapped in as secure. Perhaps that is what you mean by "rpi does not provide security"? I also don't know what you mean by "a TPM does not work". Dan. From: Iñigo Vicente Waliño <inigovicentewalino(a)gmail.com> Sent: 08 January 2020 14:54 To: Dan Handley <Dan.Handley(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-A] Does ARMv8 TrustZone provide a secure ROM? Assuming that BL1 is used and implemented in ROM, for example, with an rpi. How do we ensure that the ROM is safe? He sought that rpi does not provide security and that a TPM does not work. Why? Thanks. El mié., 8 ene. 2020 a las 13:21, Dan Handley via TF-A (<tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>>) escribió: Hi Inigo TrustZone is a trademark referring to the security extensions of the Arm architecture. That is separate to BL1, which is the first boot stage of Trusted Firmware-A (or some other equivalent boot firmware). The expectation is that BL1, if used, is implemented in ROM to provide the Root of Trust for the Application Processor (AP). An alternative flow is for a separate "security processor" to authenticate the AP firmware before the AP is released from reset. In such a flow, there is no need for BL1 and BL2 since that functionality is provided by the security processor. In such a flow, the TF-A RESET_TO_BL31 config can be used (see in-source documentation). A TPM can provide additional security by storing secrets not even visible to TrustZone software (e.g. root keys or boot measurements). However, TPMs typically don't do firmware authentication on their own; some other software will need to use the secrets it stores, e.g. boot firmware may ask the TPM verify a signature corresponding to the next boot stage. > If the TPM is changed to another, is the boot performed? That depends on your system design. Dan. > -----Original Message----- > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Iñigo > Vicente Waliño via TF-A > Sent: 08 January 2020 10:33 > To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> > Subject: [TF-A] Does ARMv8 TrustZone provide a secure ROM? > > Hi, > > Does ARMv8 TrustZone provide BL1 in a secure ROM? Can a TPM be used as a > trusted root or is it useless? > If the TPM is changed to another, is the boot performed? > > Thanks, > Inigo. > -- > TF-A mailing list > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-A@lists.trustedfirmware.org> > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. -- TF-A mailing list TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-A@lists.trustedfirmware.org> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. -- TF-A mailing list TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a

4 years, 10 months

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Updates to the Change Log process

by Lauren Wehrmeister

Hi, We are intending to move the updates to the change log from completely release based to more rolling updates. I have created a new change log file in the docs directory (change-log-upcoming.rst) for changes that need to be included for the upcoming release: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3081. The intention is for individual developers to update the document with the relevant patch as the code change is being made. The usual change log document (docs/change-log.rst) will be updated at release time to include all changes for each release. Thanks, Lauren

4 years, 10 months

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Re: [TF-A] Does ARMv8 TrustZone provide a secure ROM?

by Dan Handley

(Back on the list) By rpi I guess you mean Raspberry Pi? > How do we ensure that the ROM is safe? I'm not sure what you mean by "safe". By definition the ROM is non-modifiable but maybe you also want it to be non-readable by normal world software? Although Raspberry Pi contains CPUs that implement TrustZone, I believe there is no TrustZone Controller IP policing access to memory so there is nothing preventing normal world software from accessing memory that is mapped in as secure. Perhaps that is what you mean by "rpi does not provide security"? I also don't know what you mean by "a TPM does not work". Dan. From: Iñigo Vicente Waliño <inigovicentewalino(a)gmail.com> Sent: 08 January 2020 14:54 To: Dan Handley <Dan.Handley(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-A] Does ARMv8 TrustZone provide a secure ROM? Assuming that BL1 is used and implemented in ROM, for example, with an rpi. How do we ensure that the ROM is safe? He sought that rpi does not provide security and that a TPM does not work. Why? Thanks. El mié., 8 ene. 2020 a las 13:21, Dan Handley via TF-A (<tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>>) escribió: Hi Inigo TrustZone is a trademark referring to the security extensions of the Arm architecture. That is separate to BL1, which is the first boot stage of Trusted Firmware-A (or some other equivalent boot firmware). The expectation is that BL1, if used, is implemented in ROM to provide the Root of Trust for the Application Processor (AP). An alternative flow is for a separate "security processor" to authenticate the AP firmware before the AP is released from reset. In such a flow, there is no need for BL1 and BL2 since that functionality is provided by the security processor. In such a flow, the TF-A RESET_TO_BL31 config can be used (see in-source documentation). A TPM can provide additional security by storing secrets not even visible to TrustZone software (e.g. root keys or boot measurements). However, TPMs typically don't do firmware authentication on their own; some other software will need to use the secrets it stores, e.g. boot firmware may ask the TPM verify a signature corresponding to the next boot stage. > If the TPM is changed to another, is the boot performed? That depends on your system design. Dan. > -----Original Message----- > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Iñigo > Vicente Waliño via TF-A > Sent: 08 January 2020 10:33 > To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> > Subject: [TF-A] Does ARMv8 TrustZone provide a secure ROM? > > Hi, > > Does ARMv8 TrustZone provide BL1 in a secure ROM? Can a TPM be used as a > trusted root or is it useless? > If the TPM is changed to another, is the boot performed? > > Thanks, > Inigo. > -- > TF-A mailing list > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-A@lists.trustedfirmware.org> > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. -- TF-A mailing list TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-A@lists.trustedfirmware.org> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

4 years, 10 months

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Re: [TF-A] Does ARMv8 TrustZone provide a secure ROM?

by Dan Handley

Hi Inigo TrustZone is a trademark referring to the security extensions of the Arm architecture. That is separate to BL1, which is the first boot stage of Trusted Firmware-A (or some other equivalent boot firmware). The expectation is that BL1, if used, is implemented in ROM to provide the Root of Trust for the Application Processor (AP). An alternative flow is for a separate "security processor" to authenticate the AP firmware before the AP is released from reset. In such a flow, there is no need for BL1 and BL2 since that functionality is provided by the security processor. In such a flow, the TF-A RESET_TO_BL31 config can be used (see in-source documentation). A TPM can provide additional security by storing secrets not even visible to TrustZone software (e.g. root keys or boot measurements). However, TPMs typically don't do firmware authentication on their own; some other software will need to use the secrets it stores, e.g. boot firmware may ask the TPM verify a signature corresponding to the next boot stage. > If the TPM is changed to another, is the boot performed? That depends on your system design. Dan. > -----Original Message----- > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Iñigo > Vicente Waliño via TF-A > Sent: 08 January 2020 10:33 > To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > Subject: [TF-A] Does ARMv8 TrustZone provide a secure ROM? > > Hi, > > Does ARMv8 TrustZone provide BL1 in a secure ROM? Can a TPM be used as a > trusted root or is it useless? > If the TPM is changed to another, is the boot performed? > > Thanks, > Inigo. > -- > TF-A mailing list > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

4 years, 10 months

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Does ARMv8 TrustZone provide a secure ROM?

by Iñigo Vicente Waliño

Hi, Does ARMv8 TrustZone provide BL1 in a secure ROM? Can a TPM be used as a trusted root or is it useless? If the TPM is changed to another, is the boot performed? Thanks, Inigo.

4 years, 10 months

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(no subject)

by Iñigo Vicente Waliño

Hi, Does ARMv8 TrustZone provide BL1 in a secure ROM? Can a TPM be used as a trusted root or is it useless? If the TPM is changed to another, is the boot performed? Thanks, Inigo.

4 years, 10 months

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Re: [TF-A] [RFC] New feature in TF-A to load encrypted FIP payloads

by Sandrine Bailleux

Hi Sumit, On 1/8/20 7:09 AM, Sumit Garg via TF-A wrote: > Hi Sandrine, > > On Fri, 20 Dec 2019 at 12:29, Sumit Garg <sumit.garg(a)linaro.org> wrote: >> >> Hi Sandrine, >> >> On Wed, 18 Dec 2019 at 21:07, Sandrine Bailleux >> <Sandrine.Bailleux(a)arm.com> wrote: >>> >>> Hi Sumit, >>> >>> I've started providing some early review comments on your patches in >>> Gerrit but these are mainly about implementation details. I would like >>> to continue the higher-level design discussions here in parallel on the >>> mailing list, if that's fine with you. >>> >> >> Yes that's perfectly fine with me. >> > > Do you have any further comments? As I have already incorporated most > of the your comments related to design and implementation details in > latest v4 patch-set [1]. > > [1] https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22tbbr%252Ffw_enc%22+(status:op… Apologies, with the Christmas break, I haven't had a chance to look at your patches again. I will allocate some time for it this week and get back to you. Regards, Sandrine

4 years, 10 months

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Re: [TF-A] [RFC] New feature in TF-A to load encrypted FIP payloads

by Sandrine Bailleux

Hi Sumit, I've started providing some early review comments on your patches in Gerrit but these are mainly about implementation details. I would like to continue the higher-level design discussions here in parallel on the mailing list, if that's fine with you. On 12/6/19 1:29 PM, Sumit Garg via TF-A wrote: > Hi Sandrine, > > On Thu, 5 Dec 2019 at 20:31, Sandrine Bailleux > <Sandrine.Bailleux(a)arm.com> wrote: >>>> Also, I am still trying to get my head around how this would integrate >>>> with a cryptographic engine where the key does not leave the chip. I can >>>> imagine that we could get the address of the encrypted firmware image >>>> from the FIP, pass that to a cryptographic engine, request it to decrypt >>>> it and store the result somewhere in Trusted RAM. In this case, we >>>> wouldn't call plat_get_fip_encryption_key(). Do you have any idea how we >>>> would pull this off? Like how the different modules (IO layer, crypto >>>> module, image parser module, ...) would integrate together? >>> >>> In this case, I would expect platform to provide key identifier rather >>> than actual key as part of plat_get_fip_encryption_key() which is then >>> passed onto auth_decrypt() that is implementation specific to >>> cryptographic engine in similar terms as currently done for mbedTLS >>> backend. >> >> Ah I see, so plat_get_fip_encryption_key() could return either the key >> itself or a key identifier. Just like plat_get_rotpk_info() can return >> either the key or a hash of it today. However, in the case of >> plat_get_rotpk_info(), it also returns some flags indicating which one >> it is. Don't we need something similar for >> plat_get_fip_encryption_key()? How will the crypto module be able to >> tell the difference between a key and a key ID otherwise? Or would you >> expect a given crypto module backend to always use either keys or key >> IDs, but not both? >> > > It perfectly makes sense for crypto module backend to support both key > ID and actual key. But I was thinking from use-case perspective that > why would one like to expose key to the firmware if the crypto module > could better protect it. And I could come up with one use-case where > the SSK (burnt in SoC fuses) is provided as an actual key and BSSK > (accessible only to crypto module) is provided via a key ID. Yes, that makes sense to me. > So yes I agree with you to provide additional flags field along with > key buffer. Also, I think it makes sense to rename > "plat_get_fip_encryption_key()" to "plat_get_fip_enc_key_info()". Agree. >>>> I have some concerns around the generation of the initialization vectors >>>> in the encrypt_fw tool. Right now, IVs are simply a random sequence of >>>> bytes (obtained through a call to OpenSSL's RAND_bytes() API). Now, I >>>> would imagine that RAND_bytes() is typically based on a good random >>>> number generator and thus will generate different sequences every time >>>> it is called. At least, as long as it is called from the same machine >>>> every time. But what if we encrypt a new FIP bundle from a different >>>> machine, say in the context of a firmware update? Is it not possible >>>> that it might choose the same IV out of bad luck? >>>> >>>> Perhaps that's an issue left to provisioning/manufacturing time and is >>>> out of the scope here. But it worries me because AFAIU, the security of >>>> AES-GCM is critically undermined if the same nonce is used multiple >>>> times with the same key (see section 5.1.1. "Nonce reuse" in RFC 5116). >>>> If the encryption key is the SSK (rather than the BSSK) then I guess the >>>> probability is even higher, as it is shared amongst a class of devices. >>>> >>> >>> Agree that "nonce" should be unique and using a random number >>> generator available on build machine was an effort towards that. But >>> thinking about the case that you have mentioned, I think we could have >>> an optional user provided "nonce" as an input to "encrypt_fw" tool, so >>> that the user is aware to randomly generate and provide a unique >>> nonce. >> >> Yes, I like your suggestion of specifying the nonce to the tool. But I >> think it should be the default behaviour then. You mention an *optional* >> user-provided nonce, I would like to suggest we make this mandatory >> instead. We could provide an option to request the tool to generate the >> nonce, intended for development purposes. >> > > Making nonce as default and mandatory command line option seems to be > overkill for a user. It may also lead to unsafe practices of > hardcoding a nonce in Makefile, shell scripts etc. So I think we > should keep this as optional only for a narrow use-case where people > might not trust uniqueness property of RNG from multiple build > machines. I don't know... Hard-coding a nonce in the makefile is unsafe for sure but I would think that a nonce generated by the tool is also unsafe without proper management of these nonces across keys and devices, but in a much more subtle manner. I still think the nonce generation would be better left outside of the scope of this tool. > BTW, I have already added nonce command line option as part of v3 > patch-set [1]. Please have a look. > > [1] https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/2496/2..3 > >>>> Impact on memory footprint and performance >>>> ------------------------------------------ >>>> >>>> Do you know what the performance impact is when this feature is enabled >>>> in TF-A, to decrypt images at boot time? Obviously it depends on the >>>> platform and whether there is a dedicated cryptographic engine, and I >>>> suppose you cannot really get any relevant measurements out of QEMU but >>>> I would be interested if you've got any rough numbers. >>> >>> Following are measurements based on qemu for mbedTLS software library >>> based authenticated decryption: >>> >>> BL31 plain: >>> NOTICE: Load image time: 137us, size: 28KB >>> BL31 encrypted: >>> NOTICE: Load image time: 3979us, size: 28KB >>> >>> BL32 plain: >>> NOTICE: Load image time: 1791us, size: 360KB >>> BL32 encrypted: >>> NOTICE: Load image time: 36339us, size: 360KB >> >> Thanks. So it's a 29% increase for BL31 and 20% for BL32. I would have >> naively expected similar percentages, any idea why we get such a >> difference between BL31 and BL32? I am just curious. Maybe it's down to >> how the crypto algorithm/mode of operation works under the hood? > > Yes this additional increase for BL31 seems to be due to one time > initialization operations carried on first invocation of mbedTLS gcm > APIs, especially time taken to generate AES tables (see call to > aes_gen_tables() in mbedtls/library/aes.c +576). Ah I see, thanks for the explanation. Regarding the memory impact, given that it's adding quite a bit of code and data (around 9KB for BL1 and 12KB for BL2 from what you were saying in a previous email), I think we need to make this feature optional and wrap it under a build flag. Not everyone will need to encrypt firmware images, having only authentication is a valid use case as well. If I am not mistaken, your patches right now unconditionally pull the mbedTLS primitives into BL1 and BL2 (as long as TBBR is enabled of course). As a matter of fact, I am not able to build BL1 on FVP platform with your patches, presumably due to the unconditional size increase. The following build command: > make TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT=1 ARM_ROTPK_LOCATION=devel_rsa MBEDTLS_DIR=mbedtls bl1 ... fails at link time: aarch64-linux-gnu-ld.bfd: build/fvp/release/bl1/bl1.elf section `xlat_table' will not fit in region `RAM' aarch64-linux-gnu-ld.bfd: BL1's RW section has exceeded its limit. aarch64-linux-gnu-ld.bfd: region `RAM' overflowed by 4096 bytes Makefile:889: recipe for target 'build/fvp/release/bl1/bl1.elf' failed Regards, Sandrine

4 years, 10 months

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Re: [TF-A] [Question] Why are the log related macros defined in multiple of 10's

by Dan Handley

Hi > -----Original Message----- > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Soby Mathew > via TF-A > Sent: 06 January 2020 12:34 > To: Olivier Deprez <Olivier.Deprez(a)arm.com>; tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; > Sheetal Tigadoli <sheetal.tigadoli(a)broadcom.com> > Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> > Subject: Re: [TF-A] [Question] Why are the log related macros defined in > multiple of 10's > > > Hi All, > > > > I wanted to understand the reason behind defining LOG_LEVEL_* macros > > as multiple of 10's, also same goes with LOG_MARKER_* macros. > > If we set the LOG macros to 1,2,3 and so on, we can avoid the mod and > > division operation when printing the msgs to console. > > > > Please let me your thoughts on this. > > > > Link to this question on Phabricator - > > https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/T624 > > > > Thanks > > Sheetal > As Sandrine said in Phabricator, the reason was simply to leave space between the levels to allow adding intermediate levels without breaking compatibility. Compatibility was a possible concern if external tools used the log level and you only rebuilt some of the TF-A components (components could end up using different values). However, I suspect the actual level value is never emitted in practice (just the text prefix) so this may not be a real concern. > Hi Sheetal > I didn't quite get reason for the optimization from multiples of 10 to > consecutive numbers. The mod operation you refer to are assertions which will > be compiled out when DEBUG=0 or when ENABLE_ASSSERTIONS=0. Other than that > there is a single divide by 10 operation within the default implementation of > plat_log_get_prefix(). > > > If the logging utility is considered performance critical, removing the > single divide by 10 will not result in any gain. Usually the bottleneck for > logs are UART baudrates and the CPU spends most of time spinning in a wait > loop for UART to be free. Hence I don't see any need for change for log > levels macro if the intent is performance optimization. > +1. Unless there's an actual performance gain, this sounds like an unnecessary change. Dan. IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

4 years, 10 months

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Re: [TF-A] [Question] Why are the log related macros defined in multiple of 10's

by Soby Mathew

On 06/01/2020 12:34, Soby Mathew via TF-A wrote: >> Hi All, >> >> I wanted to understand the reason behind defining LOG_LEVEL_* macros as >> multiple of 10's, also same goes with LOG_MARKER_* macros. >> If we set the LOG macros to 1,2,3 and so on, we can avoid the mod and >> division operation when printing the msgs to console. >> >> Please let me your thoughts on this. >> >> Link to this question on Phabricator - >> https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/T624 >> >> Thanks >> Sheetal > > Hi Sheetal > I didn't quite get reason for the optimization from multiples of 10 to > consecutive numbers. The mod operation you refer to are assertions which > will be compiled out when DEBUG=0 or when ENABLE_ASSSERTIONS=0. Other > than that there is a single divide by 10 operation within the default > implementation of plat_log_get_prefix(). > > > If the logging utility is considered performance critical, removing the > single divide by 10 will not result in any gain. Usually the bottleneck > for logs are UART baudrates and the CPU spends most of time spinning in > a wait loop for UART to be free. Hence I don't see any need for change > for log levels macro if the intent is performance optimization. > > Best Regards > Soby Mathew > Hi Sheetal There is some discussion related to this here : https://github.com/ARM-software/tf-issues/issues/462 and see associated issues and PRs for more details. Best Regards Soby Mathew >> -- >> TF-A mailing list >> TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org >> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a >> >

4 years, 10 months

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