Hello,
The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, Sep 12 at 7:00-8:00 UTC (East time zone).
Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics.
Recording and slides of previous meetings are here:
https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/
Best regards,
Anton
Hi TFM Developer Forum Organizer,
I'm currently integrating the CryptoCell3xx Runtime code for ECDSA hardware acceleration and have a question regarding the implementation.
I'm not entirely sure if this is the right list to post to - perhaps it belongs in mbed-tls or psa-crypto instead - so please forgive me and suggest the right list if this is not the appropriate forum.
I noticed that the repository contains two variants of pka_ec_wrst_smul: one under no_scap and another under scap, located in
/lib/ext/cryptocell-312-runtime/codesafe/src/crypto_api/pki/ec_wrst/.
From the filenames and comments, it appears that scap.c is the Side-Channel Attack (SCA)-resistant version, and would therefore be preferred for end-user products where stronger security is prioritized over performance.
However, in the current version of pka_ec_wrst_smul_scap.c from the main open-source branch, I found a couple of apparent typos/bugs that cause compilation errors:
Line 239: should probably be
PkaAddJcbJcb2Mdf(EC_SIGN_REG_XS, EC_SIGN_REG_YS, EC_SIGN_REG_ZS, EC_SIGN_REG_TS,
EC_SIGN_REG_XS, EC_SIGN_REG_YS, EC_SIGN_REG_ZS,
EC_SIGN_REG_X2, EC_SIGN_REG_T2, EC_SIGN_REG_Z2);
(currently missing the leading "P".)
Lines 389 and 391: the output parameters are declared as const, which seems incorrect. For example:
CCError_t PkaEcWrstScalarMult(const CCEcpkiDomain_t *pDomain, /*!< [in] Pointer to EC domain. */
const uint32_t *scalar, /*!< [in] Pointer to the scalar buffer. */
uint32_t scalSizeInWords, /*!< [in] Size of the scalar in 32-bit words. */
uint32_t *inPointX, /*!< [in] Pointer to input point X coordinate. */
const uint32_t *inPointY, /*!< [in] Pointer to input point Y coordinate. */
const uint32_t *outPointX, /*!< [out] Pointer to output point X coordinate. */
The const qualifier on the output parameters seems unintended and rather for inPointX.
Because of these issues, it seems this file might not have been recently reviewed or tested.
So, my questions are:
1. Is the CryptoCell312 Runtime actively maintained and tested in a specific branch where these typos/bugs are already fixed? If so, could you please share which branch that is?
2. If not, it seems that CMake currently only selects the no_scap variant. Does this mean the scap variant is not actively maintained or tested, and therefore not recommended for production use due to higher risk?
Thanks in advance for your help and clarification.
Best regards,
Masaki Sato
(P.S. I have sent this message from proofpoint TFM list by "Start a new thread" button. However, I don't see a record on the "posting activity" under my account profile nor active discussion list. Pardon me, but I'm a newbie to this forum, so please forgive me to send the same message by email.
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Hello,
I would like to inform the community that the TF-M v2.3.0 release has been postponed to April 2026 in order to incorporate the forthcoming PSA-Crypto LTS release, anticipated in Q1 2026.
This decision is intended to ensure improved long-term alignment between two projects.
I apologize for any inconvenience the delay may cause and appreciate your understanding.
Best regards,
Anton
Hello,
I have already poted this. but, i can't find my thread.
I’m trying to enable the PLATFORM_PSA_ADAC_SECURE_DEBUG.
1) Platform (arm neoverse RDV3R1 (RSE))
repo init -u https://git.gitlab.arm.com/infra-solutions/reference-design/infra-refdesign… -m <manifest-file-name> -b refs/tags/<RELEASE_TAG> --depth=1
repo sync -c -j $(nproc) --fetch-submodules --force-sync --no-clone-bundle
manifest file: pinned-rdv3r1.xml
release tag: refs/tags/RD-INFRA-2025.07.03
2) Enabling the ADAC Parameter
\\wsl.localhost\Ubuntu-22.04\home\phillip\251020_ws\tf-m\config\config_base.cmake
I changed the parameter from FALSE to TRUE.
set(PLATFORM_PSA_ADAC_SECURE_DEBUG TRUE CACHE BOOL "Whether to use psa-adac secure debug.")
3) Build Command
phillip@phillip3420:~/251020_ws$ ./build-scripts/build-tf-m.sh -p rdv3r1 -f uefi build
4) Error Message
===============================================================================
-- Populating libpsaadac
-- Configuring done (0.0s)
-- Generating done (0.0s)
-- Build files have been written to: /home/phillip/251020_ws/tf-m/cmake_build/rdv3r1/0/lib/ext/libpsaadac-subbuild
[1/9] Creating directories for 'libpsaadac-populate'
[1/9] Performing download step (git clone) for 'libpsaadac-populate'
Cloning into 'libpsaadac-src'...
HEAD is now at 819a254 Platform: Fix prototype for crypto_hw_apply_debug_permissions
[2/9] Performing update step for 'libpsaadac-populate'
-- Already at requested ref: 819a254af6fb5eefdcef194ec85d2c7627451351
[3/9] No patch step for 'libpsaadac-populate'
[5/9] No configure step for 'libpsaadac-populate'
[6/9] No build step for 'libpsaadac-populate'
[7/9] No install step for 'libpsaadac-populate'
[8/9] No test step for 'libpsaadac-populate'
[9/9] Completed 'libpsaadac-populate'
CMake Error at cmake_build/rdv3r1/0/lib/ext/libpsaadac-src/target/trusted-firmware-m/config.cmake:12 (Message):
Platform arm/rse/neoverse_rd/rdv3r1 not supported.
Call Stack (most recent call first):
cmake_build/rdv3r1/0/lib/ext/libpsaadac-src/CMakeLists.txt:34 (include)
-- Configuring incomplete, errors occurred!
+++ handle_error
++++ caller 0
+++ local 'callinfo=93 do_build ./build-scripts/build-tf-m.sh'
+++ local script=./build-scripts/build-tf-m.sh
+++ local lineno=93
+++ local 'func=93 do_build'
+++ func=do_build
+++ echo
+++ echo -en '\e[1m\e[31mBuild failed: error while running do_build at line '
Build failed: error while running do_build at line +++ echo -en '93 in ./build-scripts/build-tf-m.sh for rdv3r1[rdv3r1]'
93 in ./build-scripts/build-tf-m.sh for rdv3r1[rdv3r1]+++ echo -e '[uefi].\e[0m'
[uefi].
+++ echo
+++ exit 1
===============================================================================
5) My opinion
TFM_PLATFORM_PATH is "/home/phillip/251020_ws/tf-m/cmake_build/rdv3r1/0/lib/ext/libpsaadac-src/target/trusted-firmware-m/platform/arm/rse/neoverse_rd/rdv3r1" in my workpace.
But, in the "/home/phillip/251020_ws/tf-m/cmake_build/rdv3r1/0/lib/ext/libpsaadac-src/target/trusted-firmware-m/platform/arm/rse/" directory, there are only two folders, "common" and "tc".
PLATFORM_PSA_ADAC_VERSION should be changed?
(The RD-INFRA-2025.07.03 source code use PLATFORM_PSA_ADAC_VERSION as 819a254)
I would be grateful for any advice or pointers from anyone familiar with this.
Thanks
Best Regards
Phillip
Dear TF-M Community,
I have a question regarding rollback protection in Internal Trusted Storage.
Scenario:
Recently we are seeing an increasing number of products which will come to market without internal Flash; together with this, there is also the requirement to store permanent keys using PSA key management APIs as psa_import_key, which will then in turn use Internal Trusted Storage as place where keys will be written. Considering these requirements there is a necessity to implement the Internal Trusted Storage in external Flash, which brings with it security challenges: the keys stored in external Flash would require confidentiality but also rollback protection.
The encryption of ITS encryption was recently enabled as you can see in the following Pull request https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/15096, but rollback protection is not yet implemented.
Proposal:
Our proposal would be to:
- Add ITS rollback protection as optional feature, since it is not desired feature for product where the ITS storage is internal
- Add rollback protection mechanism to Internal Trusted Storage functions relying on the NV counters APIs called from the platform layer, similar as is already done for Protected Storage
Also, we are open to discuss any other proposal which would help us to fulfill the above requests (ITS in external Flash with still providing confidentiality and rollback protection).
Thanks in advance for the answer and further guidance on the topic.
KR,
Bojan Simoneta
Bojan Simoneta
(He / Him / His)
Principal Embedded SW Engineer
Phone: +433124 299160
Email: bojan.simoneta(a)nxp.com<mailto:bojan.simoneta@nxp.com>
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Hi all,
We are considering moving the TF-M Coverity scan (the results from https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/view/TF-M/job/tf-m-coverity/) to a private instance.
I am sending this out to find out if anyone who is external to Arm uses these results, or would like to see the results in the future. If there is interest in keeping the public one working then we can have both the private and public ones running alongside each other to keep the results visible.
Please let me know if you are a user of the current Coverity system, or wish to be able to view the results in the future so the jobs can be configured accordingly. If no interest is shown then the Coverity scan will be switched over to only the private instance.
Thanks,
Matt Dalzell - Arm
