- mbed-tls - lists.trustedfirmware.org

Re: [mbed-tls] 3.0 plans: remove memory_buffer_alloc.c from the code base

by Dan Handley

Hi There has already been some discussion about a shared C standard library implementation, at least for TF-A and TF-M. So far there's been general agreement that this is a good idea but no actual commitment from anyone to make this happen, since each project is reasonably happy with what they've got. Regarding MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C, TF-A at least enables this so removing this from the codebase would be an issue there. Memory allocators are probably not the core expertise of other Trusted Firmware projects either but it needs to be if they're going to use them! I propose that we move this allocator into a new shared TrustedFirmware.org standard C library project and work with the other projects to ensure it has the correct initial maintainers. This will probably have to be driven by the maintainers of whichever project is most motivated to make this happen. It sounds like that could be Mbed TLS and this will need to be done before any separation of the PSA Crypto implementation. In the short term, as we move C stdlib functionality out of the other projects and into this new project, we will need to support multiple implementations of some functions. Eventually we should move towards a common implementation, and I agree we should look at what security-oriented implementations are already available. I also agree it would make sense for Mbed TLS to not use the toolchain-provided stdlib implementation by default, but only once it uses a default implementation it trusts. Regards Dan. > -----Original Message----- > From: mbed-tls <mbed-tls-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of > Ronald Cron via mbed-tls > Sent: 09 April 2020 08:47 > To: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > Subject: Re: [mbed-tls] 3.0 plans: remove memory_buffer_alloc.c from the code > base > > Hi, I think this is related to the more general need for an implementation of > the C standard library for trusted firmware projects. As far as I know TF-A > and TF-M don't use the standard library provided by compilation toolchains. > The rationale is to have complete control over the trusted firmware code. > Currently they both have their own partial implementation of the parts of the > C standard library they need. > > This memory_buffer_alloc.c module in question here is another partial > implementation of the C standard library. Currently TF-A and TF-M don't > use/provide dynamic memory allocations but PSA-FF explicitly mentions that an > SPM implementation may support dynamic memory allocation. Thus it is possible > that TF-M at some point consider providing dynamic memory allocation support. > > All of this to say that a possible way forward may be to remove > memory_buffer_alloc.c from the code base when there is a C standard library > implementation common to trustedfirmware.org projects (is there already a > security oriented open source implementation out there ?). > > In Mbed TLS, it would also make sense to me to, by default, not use C > standard libraries provided by compilation toolchains > (MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS defined by default). > > Thanks, Ronald. > > > -----Original Message----- > From: mbed-tls <mbed-tls-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of > Manuel Pegourie-Gonnard via mbed-tls > Sent: 08 April 2020 12:42 > To: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> > Subject: [mbed-tls] 3.0 plans: remove memory_buffer_alloc.c from the code > base > > Hi all, > > In this new installment of "let's discuss ideas for Mbed TLS 3.0" [1]: > should we remove memory_buffer_alloc.c from the code base? > > [1]: https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/mbed-tls/tech-plans-3.0/ > > Currently the crypto library includes a module called memory_buffer_alloc.c, > disabled in the default build (config.h option MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C), > which provides implementations of calloc() and free() based on a user- > provided buffer (which could be static or on the stack), suitable for use in > the rest of the crypto, X.509 and TLS libraries as replacements to the > standard functions. > > In addition to providing replacement calloc() and free(), the module also > offers some facilities for measurement and debugging. > > We're considering dropping this module and removing it from the code base > entirely for the following reasons: > > - Memory allocators are not our core area of expertise. > > - This allocator is pretty basic and has a large allocation overhead. For > example for ECC computations, the overhead can be as large as the actual > memory used. > > - Using this allocator also tends to slow things down, so we don't run many > tests with it enabled. > > - In the future when we split between PSA Crypto on one side and Mbed TLS and > X.509 on the other, it's unclear on which side this allocator should fall. > Which can be taken as a sign that it doesn't really belong here. > > On the other hand, we're hesitating for the following reasons: > > - We know from bug reports and questions that some people are using it. > > - Unlike other modules we'd like to drop, there isn't a strong security > incentive to dropping this allocator, it's merely a matter of how we spend > our maintenance resources. > > What do you think? Should we keep maintaining this allocator as part of Mbed > TLS? Should we drop it and focus on our core instead? If you're using this > allocator, why did you pick it over other alternatives? > > Regards, > Manuel. > -- > mbed-tls mailing list > mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/mbed-tls > IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are > confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended > recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the > contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the > information in any medium. Thank you. > -- > mbed-tls mailing list > mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/mbed-tls IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

5 years

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Re: [mbed-tls] 3.0 plans: remove memory_buffer_alloc.c from the code base

by Ronald Cron

Hi, I think this is related to the more general need for an implementation of the C standard library for trusted firmware projects. As far as I know TF-A and TF-M don't use the standard library provided by compilation toolchains. The rationale is to have complete control over the trusted firmware code. Currently they both have their own partial implementation of the parts of the C standard library they need. This memory_buffer_alloc.c module in question here is another partial implementation of the C standard library. Currently TF-A and TF-M don't use/provide dynamic memory allocations but PSA-FF explicitly mentions that an SPM implementation may support dynamic memory allocation. Thus it is possible that TF-M at some point consider providing dynamic memory allocation support. All of this to say that a possible way forward may be to remove memory_buffer_alloc.c from the code base when there is a C standard library implementation common to trustedfirmware.org projects (is there already a security oriented open source implementation out there ?). In Mbed TLS, it would also make sense to me to, by default, not use C standard libraries provided by compilation toolchains (MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS defined by default). Thanks, Ronald. -----Original Message----- From: mbed-tls <mbed-tls-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Manuel Pegourie-Gonnard via mbed-tls Sent: 08 April 2020 12:42 To: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [mbed-tls] 3.0 plans: remove memory_buffer_alloc.c from the code base Hi all, In this new installment of "let's discuss ideas for Mbed TLS 3.0" [1]: should we remove memory_buffer_alloc.c from the code base? [1]: https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/mbed-tls/tech-plans-3.0/ Currently the crypto library includes a module called memory_buffer_alloc.c, disabled in the default build (config.h option MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C), which provides implementations of calloc() and free() based on a user-provided buffer (which could be static or on the stack), suitable for use in the rest of the crypto, X.509 and TLS libraries as replacements to the standard functions. In addition to providing replacement calloc() and free(), the module also offers some facilities for measurement and debugging. We're considering dropping this module and removing it from the code base entirely for the following reasons: - Memory allocators are not our core area of expertise. - This allocator is pretty basic and has a large allocation overhead. For example for ECC computations, the overhead can be as large as the actual memory used. - Using this allocator also tends to slow things down, so we don't run many tests with it enabled. - In the future when we split between PSA Crypto on one side and Mbed TLS and X.509 on the other, it's unclear on which side this allocator should fall. Which can be taken as a sign that it doesn't really belong here. On the other hand, we're hesitating for the following reasons: - We know from bug reports and questions that some people are using it. - Unlike other modules we'd like to drop, there isn't a strong security incentive to dropping this allocator, it's merely a matter of how we spend our maintenance resources. What do you think? Should we keep maintaining this allocator as part of Mbed TLS? Should we drop it and focus on our core instead? If you're using this allocator, why did you pick it over other alternatives? Regards, Manuel. -- mbed-tls mailing list mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/mbed-tls IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

5 years

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Re: [mbed-tls] 3.0 plans: remove memory_buffer_alloc.c from the code base

by ROSHINI DEVI

Hello All, In our embedded platform, we are using static memory allocator, instead of using heap memory of the platform. We thought it is better way to handle the memory. As the application grows, there might be multiple libraries using the heap memory. And also the possible cause of memory leaks. My suggestion is that it is better to have it. I have seen this kind of allocator in mocona secure library also. Thanks On Wed, Apr 8, 2020 at 4:11 PM Manuel Pegourie-Gonnard via mbed-tls < mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > Hi all, > > In this new installment of "let's discuss ideas for Mbed TLS 3.0" [1]: > should we remove memory_buffer_alloc.c from the code base? > > [1]: https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/mbed-tls/tech-plans-3.0/ > > Currently the crypto library includes a module called > memory_buffer_alloc.c, > disabled in the default build (config.h option > MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C), > which provides implementations of calloc() and free() based on a > user-provided > buffer (which could be static or on the stack), suitable for use in the > rest > of the crypto, X.509 and TLS libraries as replacements to the standard > functions. > > In addition to providing replacement calloc() and free(), the module also > offers some facilities for measurement and debugging. > > We're considering dropping this module and removing it from the code base > entirely for the following reasons: > > - Memory allocators are not our core area of expertise. > > - This allocator is pretty basic and has a large allocation overhead. For > example for ECC computations, the overhead can be as large as the actual > memory used. > > - Using this allocator also tends to slow things down, so we don't run many > tests with it enabled. > > - In the future when we split between PSA Crypto on one side and Mbed TLS > and > X.509 on the other, it's unclear on which side this allocator should > fall. > Which can be taken as a sign that it doesn't really belong here. > > On the other hand, we're hesitating for the following reasons: > > - We know from bug reports and questions that some people are using it. > > - Unlike other modules we'd like to drop, there isn't a strong security > incentive to dropping this allocator, it's merely a matter of how we > spend > our maintenance resources. > > What do you think? Should we keep maintaining this allocator as part of > Mbed > TLS? Should we drop it and focus on our core instead? If you're using this > allocator, why did you pick it over other alternatives? > > Regards, > Manuel. > -- > mbed-tls mailing list > mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/mbed-tls >

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3.0 plans: remove memory_buffer_alloc.c from the code base

by Manuel Pegourie-Gonnard

Hi all, In this new installment of "let's discuss ideas for Mbed TLS 3.0" [1]: should we remove memory_buffer_alloc.c from the code base? [1]: https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/mbed-tls/tech-plans-3.0/ Currently the crypto library includes a module called memory_buffer_alloc.c, disabled in the default build (config.h option MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C), which provides implementations of calloc() and free() based on a user-provided buffer (which could be static or on the stack), suitable for use in the rest of the crypto, X.509 and TLS libraries as replacements to the standard functions. In addition to providing replacement calloc() and free(), the module also offers some facilities for measurement and debugging. We're considering dropping this module and removing it from the code base entirely for the following reasons: - Memory allocators are not our core area of expertise. - This allocator is pretty basic and has a large allocation overhead. For example for ECC computations, the overhead can be as large as the actual memory used. - Using this allocator also tends to slow things down, so we don't run many tests with it enabled. - In the future when we split between PSA Crypto on one side and Mbed TLS and X.509 on the other, it's unclear on which side this allocator should fall. Which can be taken as a sign that it doesn't really belong here. On the other hand, we're hesitating for the following reasons: - We know from bug reports and questions that some people are using it. - Unlike other modules we'd like to drop, there isn't a strong security incentive to dropping this allocator, it's merely a matter of how we spend our maintenance resources. What do you think? Should we keep maintaining this allocator as part of Mbed TLS? Should we drop it and focus on our core instead? If you're using this allocator, why did you pick it over other alternatives? Regards, Manuel.

5 years

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3.0 plans: remove havege.c from the code base

by Manuel Pegourie-Gonnard

Hi all, In this new installment of "let's discuss ideas for Mbed TLS 3.0" [1]: should we remove havege.c from the code base? [1]: https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/mbed-tls/tech-plans-3.0/ The crypto library currently includes an implementation of the HAVEGE entropy gatherer [2], which is disabled in the default build (MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C in config.h), but used as a source by our entropy module if enabled. [2]: https://www.irisa.fr/caps/projects/hipsor/ We'd like to drop this module and remove it from the code base entirely for the following reasons: - HAVEGE was designed for superscalar processors with high microarchitectural complexity, and is unsuitable for microcontrollers (or virtualized environments). We feel like when a complex enough CPU is used for HAVEGE to stand a chance of being secure, it's very likely that an operating system is also available, which probably already manages a random generator better that what we can do in user space. - On a more practical note, our implementation relies on `timing_hardclock()` provided by timing.c only for a limited number of architectures and environments (funnily enough, not including any Arm architecture), with a silent fallback to a definition relying on `gettimeofday()` which is clearly not high-resolution enough to make HAVEGE secure. - As with any random source, it is very difficult to assess whether HAVEGE is actually secure on any given platform. Further, the maintenance team doesn't have any specific knowledge of HAVEGE and there hasn't been any independent evaluation of our implementation of it. - As a result of the above points, we're afraid people using our HAVEGE implementation on the wrong platforms, might be getting a false sense of security, which might prevent them from using more secure options, such as the OS RNG (when using an OS) or a hardware RNG (on microcontrollers). If you're using MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C or know someone who does, or if for any other reason you think we shouldn't drop it in Mbed TLS 3.0, please speak up now! Regards, Manuel.

5 years

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3.0 plans: remove pkcs11.c from the code base

by Manuel Pegourie-Gonnard

Hi all, In this new installment of "let's discuss ideas for Mbed TLS 3.0" [1]: should we remove pkcs11.c from the code base? [1]: https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/mbed-tls/tech-plans-3.0/ The X.509 library currently includes a module called "pkcs11", excluded from the default build, which provides a few wrappers around libpkcs11-helper [2], a library that "simplifies the interaction with PKCS#11 providers for end-user applications". In practice, it supports the use of X.509 certificates associated with an RSA key (not ECDSA) managed by libpkcs11-helper. [2]: https://github.com/OpenSC/pkcs11-helper We'd like to drop this module and remove it from the code base entirely for the following reasons: - It has limited functionality, and soon PSA Crypto will provide more flexible support for secure management of private keys (not just RSA, and not just associated with X.509 certificates). - It currently has not automated tests so we're not even sure if it still works properly. - The documentation is scarce and no member of the current maintenance team knows for sure how it's supposed to work. - We never receive any support request about it so we're not sure if anyone is still using it. (As a weaker signal in the same direction, we deprecated it in 2.21.0, released 2020-02-20, and nobody complained so far.) If you're using MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C or know someone who does, or if for any other reason you think we shouldn't drop it in Mbed TLS 3.0, please speak up now! Regards, Manuel. IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

5 years

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Mbed TLS/PSA Crypto Roadmap

by Shebu Varghese Kuriakose

Hi All, Here is the link to the roadmap for Mbed TLS and PSA Crypto in the coming quarters. https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/mbed-tls/roadmap/ If you are interested in collaborating on any of the roadmap features or other features in the project, please let your interest known via. the mailing lists. Note that the expected quarter when a feature will be completed is based on very rough estimates of the effort involved and therefore might change. Roadmap will be reviewed and updated at the start of every quarter depending on progress made in previous quarter. Thanks, Shebu (Mbed TLS, PSA Crypto Technology Manager, Arm)

5 years

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3.0 plans: remove old TLS options from the code base entirely

by Manuel Pegourie-Gonnard

Hi all, As a general rule I'll start a thread of each of the changes to be discussed for inclusion in Mbed TLS 3.0, but as an exception to that rule, I'm grouping several items here because I suspect they probably won't generate much discussion (if any). Note: in general we keep obsolete crypto primitives in the code base (disabled by default at compile time), so that people can still use them to process old data at rest. This list however is about TLS options, i. e. handling live data in transit, so it makes sense to completely remove them from the code base once they're not used any more. It also decreases the complexity of the code base, hence improving its maintainability, testability and security. * Drop support for parsing SSLv2 ClientHello (`MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO`). This was only needed back when common frameworks (old version of Java most motably) used this format for ClientHellos for compatibility with old an buggy servers, and when people would actually consider negociating SSL 2.0. Fortunately, that's not the case any more. Also, removing this unblocks some much-needed refactorings and simplification of the code (and this option has become hard to test). * Drop support for SSLv3 (`MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3`). This version of the protocol was deprecated by the IETF (MUST NOT use since 2015 - RFC 7568) and is no longer widely used. * Drop support for compatibility with our own previous buggy implementation of truncated HMAC (`MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT`). This is only useful for people who want to interoperate with buggy pre-2.7 Mbed TLS. Since those versions are no longer maintained, hopefully everyone has updated by now. * Drop support for TLS record-level compression (`MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT`). There are potential security issues with this option (compression if any should be done at the appplication level in order to separate secrets from attacker-controlled content), it's not widely used, and was removed in TLS 1.3. * Drop RC4 ciphersuites. These have been prohibited by RFC 7465 since 2015. (Note: as a bonus, we can then remove the config.h option `MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES` as well.) * Drop the single-DES ciphersuites. 56-bit keys, need I say more? * Support for SSL record hardware acceleration (`MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL`). Nobody in the team knows how it's supposed to work, it's entirely untested, and we think nobody uses it, it's been failing to build for a while and nobody complained so far. (Note: we still fixed the bug, see PR #2262.) Do you agree with the above list? Are you (or people you know) using one of those features? Would you add things to that list (keeping the focus on SSL/TLS obsolete features for now)? Thanks in advance for sharing your thoughts! Regards, Manuel.

5 years

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Re: [mbed-tls] Plans for Mbed TLS 3.0

by Manuel Pegourie-Gonnard

Hi again, Note: I've created a wiki page [1] to summarize and consolidate the results of the discussions that will be happening here about Mbed TLS 3.0. [1]: https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/mbed-tls/tech-plans-3.0/ I also wanted to note that the current goals, as announced yesterday, contain some changes compared to what had been announced nearly one year ago [2], so I'd like to briefly recap what changed and what didn't. [2]: https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/blog/working-towards-mbed-tls-3 Preparing a future based on PSA Crypto -------------------------------------- We remain committed to that, but are now taking a different route towards that goal. Initially we started to split Mbed Crypto out of Mbed TLS, which was not the clean split between PSA Crypto and TLS/X.509 than we want in the long run, so the plan was to evolve towards that. With the experience gained, we now think it's easier to evolve things in one place, so we merged back mbed-crypto into the mbedtls repo (see [3]), and still plan on making PSA Crypto its own product, but only when we're ready to make that split cleanly. [3]: https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/3064 Also, we initially hinted that the long-standing `mbedtls_` crypto APIs would be removed in Mbed TLS 3.0 (superseded by the PSA Crypto APIs). We're now considering a more gradual and hopefully more realistic transition where Mbed TLS 3.0 continues to offer some of those APIs for compatibility with existing code-bases, and they would only be actually removed in Mbed TLS 4.0. TLS 1.3 and message processing rework ------------------------------------- This is still not part of a realistic roadmap for Mbed TLS 3.0, but still close to our hearts for the future. Switching to a new licensing and contribution model --------------------------------------------------- This has been done already. The development branch now uses Apache 2.0 only, while the LTS branches are still dual-licensed Apache/GPL2. We moved away from a CLA and closer to an inbound == outbound model (not quite == yet because of the differences between development and LTS branches), see [4]. [4]: https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/3054 Opening up the governance of the project ---------------------------------------- This also happened already. Mbed TLS is now under open governance as part of the trustedfirmware.org structure. As a consequence of this move, Mbed TLS is now more focused on building and maintaining a healthy community of users, contributors and maintainers. Again, I hope that was clear and feel free to ask if you have any question or remark. I'll follow up by starting threads on more specific items. Regards, Manuel.

5 years

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mbedTLS on ESP8266 SDK - memory issue?

by LockSafe

Hi. I have posted an issue I am having with the use of mbedTLS with ESP8266 SDK (it is freeRTOS based), I have posted my explanation in the link below, then their support asked me to send new questions to this email. If you have any doubt regarding my tests, or if you want I make more different tests, please don't hesitate do ask me. https://forums.mbed.com/t/mbedtls-on-esp8266-sdk-memory-issue/7913 Regards. <http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_cam…> Livre de vírus. www.avg.com <http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_cam…>. <#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2>

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