Hello!
Thank you for all the effort you put into Mbed TLS! It can't be easy to keep up with the flood of vulnerability reports.
I don't quite understand the impact of CVE-2026-115490. In the release notes, you write
"Fix a TLS client vulnerability caused by accepting the TLS 1.3 version (0x0304) in the legacy_version field of a TLS 1.2 ServerHello. A malicious server could cause the client to skip TLS 1.3 ServerHello post-processing and key establishment, then complete a handshake without the configured PSK or an ephemeral shared secret contributing to the session keys. This affects both PSK-only handshakes and handshakes using ephemeral key exchange, and can compromise the confidentiality and integrity of the connection. In some client configurations, this could also permit server impersonation. Reported by Ada Logics in collaboration with Anthropic. CVE-2026-115490."
My understanding of this is as follows: A malicious server can cause the session keys to become predictable. But if the server does not have a certificate that the client accepts, then the client will abort after the handshake. If the malicious server does have a certificate that the client accepts, it can already read the plaintext. Therefore, it seems to me that the main risk is the server impersonation. The release notes say that impersonation may be possible with some client configurations. Could you share more details about what those configurations are?
Best regards,
Max Fillinger
Hello! It seems we now have an AI bot active on the mailing list. I don't know who set it up, but as far as I know, it wasn't us, the maintainer team. Regarding your initial question, the security advisory for CVE-2026-115490 is now public and should contain the information you were looking for: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls-docs/blob/main/security-advisories/mbedt... Best regards, Ronald Cron
________________________________ From: Maximilian Fillinger via mbed-tls mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org Sent: Tuesday, November 17, 2026 6:32 PM To: mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [mbed-tls] Impact of CVE-2026-115490
Hello!
Thank you for all the effort you put into Mbed TLS! It can’t be easy to keep up with the flood of vulnerability reports.
I don’t quite understand the impact of CVE-2026-115490. In the release notes, you write
“Fix a TLS client vulnerability caused by accepting the TLS 1.3 version (0x0304) in the legacy_version field of a TLS 1.2 ServerHello. A malicious server could cause the client to skip TLS 1.3 ServerHello post-processing and key establishment, then complete a handshake without the configured PSK or an ephemeral shared secret contributing to the session keys. This affects both PSK-only handshakes and handshakes using ephemeral key exchange, and can compromise the confidentiality and integrity of the connection. In some client configurations, this could also permit server impersonation. Reported by Ada Logics in collaboration with Anthropic. CVE-2026-115490.”
My understanding of this is as follows: A malicious server can cause the session keys to become predictable. But if the server does not have a certificate that the client accepts, then the client will abort after the handshake. If the malicious server does have a certificate that the client accepts, it can already read the plaintext. Therefore, it seems to me that the main risk is the server impersonation. The release notes say that impersonation may be possible with some client configurations. Could you share more details about what those configurations are?
Best regards,
Max Fillinger
mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org